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Project in brief 
Baltic Science Network (BSN) serves as a forum for higher education, science and research 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). 
BSN is a policy network gathering relevant transnational, national and regional policy actors 
from the BSR countries. The Network is a springboard for targeted multilateral activities in the 
frame of research and innovation excellence, mobility of scientists and expanded 
participation. These joint activities are modelled with an overall aim to ensure that the BSR 
remains a hub of cutting-edge scientific solutions with the capacity to exploit the region’s 
full innovation and scientific potential. The activities are modelled as examples of best 
practice, which form the basis of the policy recommendations drafted by the Network. 
The platform is tailored to provide advice on how to enhance a macro-regional dimension in 
higher education, science and research cooperation. Recommendations jointly formulated by 
the Network members address the European, national and regional policy-making levels. 
BSN is a flagship of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region under the Policy Area Education, 
Research and Employability, as well as one of two cornerstones of the Science, Research and 
Innovation Agenda of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. 
 
This survey was carried out with the support of the Interreg Vb Baltic Sea Region Programme 
(ERDF 85%) and the Ministry of Education and Research of Estonia (15%). 
 
DISCLAIMER  
This working paper is based on input from stakeholders and BSN partners and does not 
necessarily reflect the views of all participating Member States and organisations. 
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Lühikokkuvõte  
Käesolev uuring analüüsib Euroopa ja spetsiifiliselt ka Läänemere teadusruumi 
koostöödünaamikaid ja koostöö tugevdamise võimalusi erineva innovatsioonivõimekusega 
riikide vahel. Läänemere teadusruumi kujundavate poliitikate puhul tuleb arvestada erinevate 
väljakutsetega:  
 
1. Kõige olulisem on riikidevaheline suhteliselt madal funktsionaalne (st arengutasemest 
ja teaduse spetsialiseerumisest tulenev teemade ja huvide) lähedus võrreldes 
geograafilise, aga samuti seadusandliku ja kultuurilise lähedusega. Seega ei ole kõik 
võimalikud teadus-, arendustegevuse ja innovatsioonipoliitika (TAI poliitika) 
eesmärgid kõigile Läänemere riikidele ühtmoodi olulised.  
2. Lisaks tekitavad mitmed globaalsed ja EL taseme trendid Läänemere riikide jaoks 
erinevaid ja asümmeetriliselt esinevaid väljakutseid, mis omakorda takistavad 
iseeneslikult suurema funktsionaalse läheduse tekkimist. Tulenevalt Läänemere 
piirkonna riikide erinevatest TAI võimekustest on Läänemere erinevatel kallastel TAI 
poliitikas võrdlemisi erinevad koostööga seotud prioriteedid: kriitilise massi loomine 
rahvusvahelise konkurentsivõime saavutamiseks vs regionaalne konvergents ja 
järelejõudmine.  
3. Lisaks mõjutab Läänemere-äärsete riikide teadussüsteeme juba praegu laiaulatuslik 
ja keeruline institutsioonide, poliitikate, instrumentide ja võrgustike süsteem ning 
teadlased ja ettevõtjad neis süsteemides tõlgendavad ja kasutavad erinevaid 
Läänemere regiooni puudutavaid koostöömeetmeid väga erinevatel eesmärkidel ja 
viisidel. EL taseme TAI strateegiate kujundamise protsessid on Läänemere regiooni 
koostöösse andnud väga olulise panuse – need on toiminud teaduskoostöö ergutajana 
(eriti teatud temaatilistes valdkondades nt mere- ja keskkonnauuringud). Samas tuleb 
nende mõju hinnata kahetiselt: ühest küljest on need protsessid kujundanud 
dünaamilise ja sidusa rahastuskeskkonna, kuid negatiivse poole pealt on samuti 
loonud juurde koordinatsiooniprobleeme nii TA tegijate, aga ka rahastajate ja 
korraldajate jaoks.  
4. Viimastel aastatel on aga mitmed tegurid ohtu seadnud mõõdukate innovaatorriikide 
(ja ka mõnede tugevate innovaatorriikide) TAI võimekuste jätkusuutlikkuse ning see ei 
tule loomulikult kasuks ka koostööle. Nendeks teguriteks on EL13 riikide suur sõltuvus 
struktuurivahenditest, aga samuti hiljutised kasinusmeetmed ning erinevate tasandite 
TAI rahastusskeemide paljusus Läänemere regioonis. Nende tegurite koosmõju on 
viinud selleni, et rahalised stiimulid domineerivad kasvavalt rahvusvahelise koostöö 
suunajatena. Seetõttu on muuhulgas oluline mõelda, kuidas suurem lähedus TAI 
süsteemide institutsionaalses korralduses aitaks olemasolevaid meetmeid paremini 
kasutada suurema sisulise/funktsionaalse läheduse saavutamiseks. Oluline on 
lähendada erinevate riikide stiimuleid nii organisatsioonide kui ka indiviidide 
(teadlaste, ettevõtjate) tasandil kogu Läänemere piirkonnas.  
 
TAI koostööinstrumentide pakette võib toimimise loogika järgi jagada kolmeks mudeliks: 
integreeritud mudel, koordineeritud mudel ja detsentraliseeritud koostöö. On selge, et EL 
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uuemad instrumendid (PCP, PPI), mis eeldavad suuremat funktsionaalset lähedust ja toimivad 
integreeritud mudeli loogika alusel, vajavad samuti mõõdukate innovaatorriikide 
seadusandlike ja juhtimisprotseduuride märkimisväärset kohanemist erinevatel tasanditel ja 
see näib olevat väga suureks probleemiks nii Balti riikides kui ka laiemalt EL13 riikides. 
Läänemere regiooni ja riiklikud meetmed on järginud pigem koordineeritud ja 
detsentraliseeritud koostöö mudeleid, mille tulemuseks võib olla see, et integratsioon EL 
suunal on tugevam (eriti arvestades meetmete finantsmahtusid). Samal ajal on nii mõnedki 
Läänemere piirkonnale olulised meetmed (BONUS; INTERREG) saanud tugevneda tänu EL 
rahastuse kasvule, mis võib anda baasi tulevaseks koostööks. 
 
Kuna paljud Läänemere riigid on väga väikesed, siis nende jaoks on strateegiliselt oluline olla 
hõlmatud võimalikult laialt erinevatesse koostöövõrgustikesse. Käesolev analüüs näitab, et 
kuigi rahastuse hulk EL raamprogrammist on kasvanud just EL13 riikides, siis võrreldes H2020 
perioodi ja FP7 perdioodi rahestusskeeme ei ole laiem integratsioon õnnestunud ei EL13 ega 
ka Läänemere regiooni riikide jaoks. Instrumente detailsemalt analüüsides selgub, et enamik 
mõõdukaid innovaatorriike saab hakkama ülesehituselt detsentraliseeritud meetmetes 
osalemisega, kuid suur osa meetmeid toimib integreeritult (nii regionaalsel tasandil kui ka 
organisatsioonide vahelises koostöös) ning neid meetmeid ei suudeta kasutada kas üldse (EL 
tasandi uuemad koostöömeetmed) või siis sünergeetiliselt oma eesmärkide saavutamiseks 
(paralleelsed regionaalsed ja EL meetmed). Paljud Euroopa Teadusruumi ja Läänemere 
piirkonna meetmed eeldavad järjest enam rahalise panustamise soovi ja võimekuse 
olemasolu, mis omakorda eeldab riikidelt suuremaid TAI investeeringute eelarveid. Praegune 
osalemise dünaamika neis meetmetes näitab, et FP9s ootab mõõdukaid innovaatorriike veelgi 
suurem “järelejõudmise” vajadus (ehk lõhe tugevate innovaatoritega kasvab). Väikeriikide 
ülikoolide kasvav integreeritus Euroopa koostöövormidesse võib edaspidi vähendada 
koostööd Läänemere ülikoolide võrgustikes. 
 
Käesolev uuring kinnitab juba teadaolevaid koostööbarjääre, nagu näiteks ebapiisav TAI 
investeeringute tase EL13 riikides, puudulik sünergia EL tasandi, riikide fookuste ja 
funktsionaalse toimimise vahel, piiratud ligipääs võrgustikele ning puudulikud kogemused 
projektitaotluste ja -juhtimise osas. Teadlased on reaktsioonina kahanevatele edukuse 
määradele asunud üha rohkem “mängima” taotlemisreeglitega et maksimeerida oma 
taotlemise edukust, mis kindlasti ei tule kasuks funktsionaalse läheduse suurendamisele ega 
ka teaduse arengule pikaaajalises perspektiivis. Geograafiline lähedus ei mängi H2020-s 
enam nii suurt rolli, pigem on oluline tulemuste rakenduslikkus (innovatsioon) ja vastavad 
partnerid, keda aga tulenevalt mõõdukate innovaatorriikide TAI süsteemide väiksusest, 
fragmenteeritusest ja nõrkusest, on seal raske leida. Seega on selge, et geograafilisest 
lähedusest ei piisa TAI koostöö arendamiseks Läänemere piirkonnas ja seda isegi suurema 
funktsionaalse lähedusega temaatilistes valdkondades.  
 
Samas, spetsiifiliselt Euroopa Teadusruumi laienemisele (widening) suunatud meetmeid 
näevad teadlased mõneti pikaajalise TAI koostöö arenguloogikaga vastuolus olevateks. Neid 
kasutatakse rahaliste probleemide lahendamiseks, kuid samas nähakse, et need ei ole 
jätkusuutlik viis TAI võimekuste ja koostöö arendamiseks. See paistab eriti välja just neis EL13 
riikides, kus on vajalikud pigem infrastruktuuriinvesteeringud kui pehmed meetmed. Sama 
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kehtib ka PPP ja P2P skeemide puhul, kus vajatakse lisaks top-up rahastamist. Seega sõltub 
mõõdukates innovaatorriikides meetmete kasutamise efektiivsus pigem strateegilistest 
otsustest ja valmidusest rahalisi kohustusi võtta: teadlased järgivad siin riigipoolseid valikuid, 
kuid tõenäoliselt ei juhi neid. Kuna EL13 riigid tegelevad aga eelkõige oma TAI süsteemide 
võimekuste rajamisega, siis riikide tasemel paistavad need meetmed olevat aga kõrvaliseks 
probleemiks. 
 
Samas peaks erinevate tasandite poliitikaid arendama süsteemsema toimimise suunas, st. EL, 
Läänemere regiooni ja riikliku tasandi otseselt seonduvate ja/või täiendavate eesmärkidega 
poliitikate kaardistamist ja positsioneerimist. Lihtsamad ja omavahel harmoneeruvad reeglid 
(sh riiklike regulatsioonide paindlikkus) vähendaksid koostööbarjääre erinevate riikide 
teadlaste vahel. Kõigis Läänemeremaades vajatakse teadlastele arusaadavat, ajakohast ja 
süsteemset toetust koostööks olulise informatsiooni jagamise näol. Euroopa Komisjon peaks 
toetama rohkem alt-üles initsiatiive reeglite harmoneerimise kaudu; meetmete edukuse 
määrade prognoositavust ja tõstmist teaduskoostööle suunatud rahastuse suurendamise 
kaudu ning oluliselt paremini kujundama oma kommunikatsioonistrateegiaid teadlastele, 
riigiasutustele, ülikoolidele ja ettevõtetele.  
 
Rahvusvahelisi parimaid praktikaid järgides peaks Läänemere regioon eelkõige määratlema 
ühised teadushuvid ning neid ka EL teadusalastes strateegiaprotsessides esindama. Seda ühist 
arusaama regiooni sees ning ühist imagot väljaspool regiooni tuleks toetada teekaardiga, mis 
ühendaks ajakohase ja süsteemse info eesmärkide ja teadusinstrumentide kohta kõigil 
poliitikakujundamise tasanditel. Läänemere-äärsed riigid peaksid seisma hea selle eest, et 
nende seadusandlus, raamatupidamise ja auditeerimise praktikad, osalemisreeglid ja –
regulatsioonid oleksid sel määral ühilduvad, et ei takistaks koostööd. Riskid peaksid samuti 
olema riigi (ja mitte üksikteadlase) tasandil maandatud, et stimuleerida teadlaste valmisolekut 
rahvusvahelisi projekte ette võtta. NCP-de parem võimestamine aitaks laiendada 
konsultatsiooni ja mentorluse tegevust.  
 
Kuna erinevaid teaduskoostöö suurendamiseks vajaminevaid poliitikameetmeid on palju, siis 
grupeerime neid selles raportis reguleerivateks instrumentideks (ehk piitsad), rahastamise 
instrumentideks (ehk präänikud), ning info ja kommunikatsiooniga seotud meetmeteks (ehk 
jutlused), mille kooskasutamine on väga oluline, et erinevad stiimulid samaaegselt “nügiksid” 
TAI süsteemis toimetavaid agente (teadlasi, ettevõtteid, ülikoole, avaliku sektori autusi jt.) 
suurema rahvusvahelise koostöö poole Läänemere piirkonnas. Kuna TAI meetmed muutuvad 
järjest komplekssemaks hõlmates rohkem ja erinevaid partnereid, siis Läänemere riikide 
ühine panustamine nii regiooni nähtavusse kui ka koostöösse, samuti kommunikatsiooni 
teadus- ja poliitikakujundamise ringkondade vahel aitaks suurendada edu saavutamise 
tõenäosust (mida võib väita suhteliselt eduka Vahemere piirkonna riikide koostöö näite 
alusel). 
 
Eelnevast johtuvalt soovitame Läänemere regiooni TAI koostöö soodustamiseks kasutada 
kahte tüüpi uudsemaid poliitikameetmeid: esiteks selliseid meetmeid, mis kiirendaksid ja 
võimendaksid alt-üles koostööalgatuste tekkimist (enamasti riikide ja organisatsioonide 
tasandi meetmed) ja teiseks sellised meetmeid, mis ülalt-alla püüavad algatada ja juhtida 
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Läänemere koostööd kas uutesse valdkondadesse ja/või uute partnerite poole (siin eelkõige 
regiooni ja riikide tasandi meetmed). Mõlemad erinevad tavapärastest eelkõige seetõttu, et 
püüavad saavutada suuremat funktsionaalset lähedust.  
 
1. Kiirendavad alt-üles suunaga tegelevad poliitikameetmed peaksid andma lisanduva 
või ka kordistava efekti Läänemere piirkonna väljakutsete lahendamiseks. Need on 
vajalikud, kuna Läänemere piirkonnas on juba lai olemasolevate meetmete raamistik, 
mille abil püütakse mobiilsust, infrastruktuuride ühiskasutust ja teaduse 
ekstsellentsust arendada. Spetsiifiliste meetmetena pakume välja ühise 
teenuspiirkonna loomisele keskenduvaid meetmeid näiteks virtuaalsete ja jagatud 
teenusepiirkondade näol. Samuti võiks luua Läänemere riikide ühise rahastamise fondi 
H2020 meetmete konkurentsis “teiseks jäänud” projektitaotluste rahastamiseks, mis 
on regiooni jaoks olulised ja mille rakendustingimused töötatakse välja ühiselt 
Läänemere riikide poolt (nt. BSN raames).  
 
2. Ülalt-alla poliitikameetmete näidetena tuleks kõne alla ühised grandid või 
koordineeritud poliitikameetmed eri riikides, mis toetaks Läänemere spetsiifiliste 
teemade rahastamist seejuures määratledes riikidevahelise tööjaotuse (nt erinevad 
riigid oma meetmetega toetaks omavahel läbiräägitult ja üksteist täiendavalt 
temaatilisi TAI fookusteemasid). Siin võiks olla võimalikuks näiteks Läänemere 
läbimurdeteaduse ‘kiirendi’, mille kaudu rahastataks suure riski, kuid ka oodatava 
suure tuluga projekte uutes või interdistsiplinaarsetes valdkondades (nt 
küberjulgeolek, suurandmed, targad linnad, biomajandus vmt), kus Läänemere 
piirkonnas kriitilise massi saavutamine on oluline globaalseks konkureerimiseks 
(jällegi võib lahendada seda nii ühiskassa kui ka riigi tasandi meetmete omavahelise 
koordineerimisega). Läänemere piirkonna kui ühise teenusruumi arendamine on üks 
võimalus, kuidas erinevaid TAI osalejaid ergutada teadustulemusi rakendama.  
 
Kõik need eeltoodud meetmed oleks võrdlemisi uuenduslikud (vähemalt regiooni tasandil) 
ning võimaldaksid ka EL kontekstis toetada Läänemere kui eeskujuks oleva piirkonna imagot 
spetsiifiliste (niši-) teadusvaldkondade toetajana ning vastavates valdkondades arendada nii 
institutsionaalseid võimekusi koostööks kui ka teaduse üldist taset. 
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Executive Summary 
This study focuses on three major topics: 
1. The set-up, governance and funding of instruments supporting RDI policies in BSR by 
answering the following quesions: 
• What are the existing RDI cooperation oriented instruments and programmes used in 
BSR countries, are they designed internally and coordinated as part of broader policy 
mixes? 
• Which instruments and programmes have had wider impact on RDI cooperation in BSR 
and more broadly? 
 
2. The mapping of existing RDI cooperation patterns and networks in BSR and the analysis of 
factors holding back their development by answering the following questions: 
• What countries and types of institutions are most actively cooperating within the ERA 
and BSR instruments? What is the role of different institutions, enterprises? 
• What factors are hindering and supporting the widening in ERA and BSR activities? 
 
3. The analysis and recommendations for developing novel cooperation-enchancing policy 
instruments in BSR by focusing on the following questions: 
• What new programmes are needed to encourage RDI partnerships in BSR? 
• What instruments could improve the participation capabilities of moderate innovators? 
• What kinds of instrument designs and managerial practices may be best suited? 
 
We find that policy challenges to enhancing research, development and innovation (RDI) 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) are manifold: 
 
1. The relatively lower functional proximity (reflected in the existence of common 
interests, both substantive and financial, regarding RDI cooperation in specific RDI 
fields e.g. food, health, energy, transport, environment, civil security, safety, maritime 
affairs, science and education, culture), compared to physical and relational proximity, 
among many BSR countries and regions implies that not all RDI challenges and actions 
will be of common interests to all regional actors.  
2. BSR cooperation is already influenced by a vast, complex and partly overlapping 
system of different institutions, policies, instruments and RDI networks. For example, 
while instruments such as those connected to EUSBSR and BONUS focus on the Baltic 
Sea as a key object of research and cooperation, in other initiatives BSR acts as a place 
or platform for cooperation (eligible territory), which will be driven not so much by 
functional proximity but by political and policy imperatives. At the same time, global 
and EU-level drivers of RDI might supersede further functional proximity in the region 
and, thus, challenge or compete with the regional and national interests and priorities. 
Differences in actual RDI capabilities of different countries or regions may also lead to 
different interests regarding RDI cooperation: more developed regions may be 
interested in building collective critical mass for global competitiveness whereas less 
developed regions may be interested in intra-regional convergence and catching-up 
effects. 
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3. A number of studies highlight that the EU-level strategy-making processes may have 
been an additional driver for transnational cooperation in BSR (especially in some 
thematic areas such as the environmental and maritime issues). The increased role of 
the EU in the region may have had a twofold effect by supporting the creation of a 
more dynamic multi-level governance model while also creating and further 
intensifying the coordination problems between different organisations and 
government levels in BSR. The “policy mixes” co-created by the EU, BSR, regional and 
national policies and initiatives are implemented by scientists and innovators and 
interpreted and used in different ways and for different purposes. Thus, the 
perceptions and actions of scientists and innovators working in this multi-level arena 
of RDI policies are crucial in determining the actual content and implementation of 
strategies and policies. 
4. Different levels of RDI funding, but also the high dependence of some countries on 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and the impact of the recent financial 
crisis and subsequent austerity trends have created the threat that especially (but not 
only) the moderate-innovator countries may be undercutting their basic RDI 
capabilities (and funding) that are necessary preconditions for functional proximity-
driven RDI cooperation. Given these differences in the importance of foreign and 
especially EU funding mechansims for RDI, a crucial issue in analysing the 
effectiveness of transational-cooperation-oriented RDI policy instruments and the 
overall policy mix is whether the locational proximity of a specific region (BSR) is 
complemented by relational and functional proximity.  
 
In BSR as a whole, the majority of RDI investments are made by Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 
Poland and three German BSR states are contributing equally, but less than the former three 
countries. While the financial capacity of Baltic States is rather marginal, the participation 
levels (participations, funding shares etc.) of the Baltic States in different BSR (but also EU) 
cooperation programmes are much larger compared to the financial capabilities of their 
innovation systems. The magnitude of EU funds has grown for the BSR region as a whole, and 
this trend is observable also in areas that can be considered core topics of BSR (environment, 
energy, maritime research etc.). Widening instruments have become less relevant for the 
whole BSR region, but ERA-NETs, for example, have gained in importance compared to the 
period of 2007-2013. 
 
As many BSR countries are small, the integration patterns vs isolation patterns in transnational 
cooperation are highly relevant. In this study, we use the segregation indexes and their 
dynamics to assess whether the BSR, but especially the EU13 countries of the region, have 
achieved wider integration within the European Research Area (ERA) and the BSR science 
cooperation (which they are aiming for) or not. We conclude that while EU13 has managed to 
gain relatively more funding from FP, this has not necessarily increased the integration of 
these countries within ERA; similarily the concentration (and not wider integration) is visible 
for the whole BSR. These results are confirmed also across most thematic instruments. We 
can argue that the BSR group is having higher isolation compared to the EU13, suggesting 
that for the moderate innovators, cooperation with other EU13 members remains wider in the 
Horizon 2020 framework. Alternatively, we can argue that thematic (functional) proximity 
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within BSR is more concentrated in H2020 projects. Those two claims further highlight the 
need to discuss the policy tensions of small countries in wider vs deeper integration in the 
EU. 
 
The thematic cooperation patterns showing the growing segregation of thematically 
important fields elaborates the challenge for BSR in developing closer functional proximity 
within BSR. The threat that global drivers will supersede thematic cooperation based on BSR 
interests (energy, health, transportation, security) seems not to be realised in H2020. Based 
on our results, we can argue that the tension between the financial incentives of thematic 
cooperation via H2020 on one hand and the broader integration to the thematic knowledge 
base on the other hand seems to be solved in favour of the former incentive. The internal BSR 
cooperation within the H2020 instruments has also not grown, as the values of isolation 
indexes are increasing between FP7 and H2020. 
 
A more detailed view on cooperation patterns within the frameworks of different instruments 
brings us to the conclusion that most of the moderate-innovator countries in BSR are 
operating quite well according to the logic of decentralised collaboration, but most of the 
instruments, growingly also on the regional level (INTERREG, BONUS, STRING – aimed at 
strengthening the meta-regional funding spaces) and inter-organisational networks (NOVA, 
BOVA cooperation) are operating in the integrated mode. As discussed above, ERA and BSR 
cooperation increasingly entails the instruments, where financial commitments backed by 
national funding are needed (e.g. Joint Programming Initiatives (JPI), PCP etc.) requiring a 
greater willingness and capacity to invest in transnational cooperation. Moderate innovators 
need to increase their contributions in this field to enter these cooperation activities or, 
alternatively, they need to catch up even more in FP9. The inter-organisational-level BSR 
cooperations contribute to the institutional richness of the region, but on the other hand, 
considering the limited capabilities of the few actors in moderate innovators, the integration 
potential of those networks is under-utilised. As moderate innovators increasingly engage in 
the activities of EU-wide networks, there can be a danger in weakening inter-organisational 
BSR cooperation forms in the future. 
 
Well-known and widely discussed cooperation barriers for moderate innovators – insufficient 
R&D investments in EU13 countries, lack of sustainable and functional synergies between 
national research systems and EU research foci, but also insufficient access to existing 
networks and limited experiences with project applications and management – also found 
support in our study. We found that while achieving higher funding levels in the context of 
low success rates of H2020 instruments, the substantive importance and content of projects 
may become secondary next to “gaming” the rules of different funds, which will be detrimental 
to functional cooperation as well as research progress in the longer term. Regarding the logics 
of putting together transnational research consortia, the geographical coherence or logic of 
projects does not matter for application success as much as the applicability and diffusion of 
research results. For moderate innovators, this has created an additional challenge of finding 
appropriate industry-/market-partners, and while SMEs and public-sector organisations can 
be found locally, collaboration with larger industry actors often takes place transnationally. 
While this may be beneficial for ERA-wide knowledge and technology diffusion and 
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networking, finding such partners internationally tends to be an additional barrier for the 
EU13 research groups and especially for new entrants to the transnational cooperation arena. 
 
Regarding the EU13 focused policy goal of “spreading excellence, widening participation” in 
ERA, most researchers seem to interpret these measures as political tools that partly 
contradict the “normal” ways of transnational cooperation that are predominantly based on 
scientific excellence, international reputation and long-term network building. Of course, 
researchers living under strong financial pressures and constraints are willing to 
accommodate their behaviour with such funding mechanisms, but they also recognise that 
this may not be a sustainable way forward if sufficient basic RDI capabilities are lacking both 
in academia and market. This seems to be especially crucial for the EU13 countries that would 
often need stronger investment into infrastructure and basic research capabilities than soft 
mechanisms of network building, such as COST, Twinning etc. The same seems to apply to 
EU’s PPP and P2P schemes and similar joint initiatives where top-up funding is needed. Thus, 
the effectiveness of these measures for EU13 seems to depend to a large extent on the 
strategic choices and commitments by policy makers: researchers are likely to follow, but not 
lead, such choices, as entrance to existing networks requires significant policy-level 
commitment and financial commitments. Overall, while such soft instruments are necessary 
for networks building and sustaining ERA, these are not the primary needs of EU13 countries 
that would need to first invest into their own basic RDI capabilities and allow the RDI systems 
to mature. 
 
Analysts and policy-makers have brought out several key lessons, best practices and 
instruments which can be suggested to all, but especially moderate-innovator countries, to 
improve their participation in H2020, namely concentrate more on functional proximity 
creation; juste retour of finances should not be the goal. As all research areas cannot be 
addressed simultaneously, a selective and strategic approach to participation is seen as 
superior demanding clear national strategic plans and appropriate alignment of EU and 
national objectives, and synergetic use of ESIF is needed to build advantages. As the 
instruments have grown in complexity, better communication of national research and policy 
circles with EU counterparts is needed, and for achieving better results, joint efforts of BSR 
countries in creating visibility but also shaping the design of these policies would probably 
lead to greater success (based on the Mediterranean cooperation example). 
 
While the specific policy instruments for increasing transnational cooperation (we suggest a 
list of policy interventions for EC, national governments, but also organisations) may differ in 
their rationales, intervention logics, institutional set-ups, scale and scope, we deploy an 
analytical framework of Verdung joining the regulatory instruments (the sticks), economic and 
financial instruments (the carrots) and informative instruments (the sermons) for bringing out 
the individual instruments, which if jointly used are “nudging” the incentives of agents 
(researchers, etrepreneurs, etc.) to increased transnational cooperation. We suggest using two 
types of transnational RDI cooperation policies – at first policies that can speed up bottom-
up transnational cooperation initiatives and, second, policies that try to initiate and steer new 
types and forms of transnational RDI cooperation either in new domains (of research, societal 
challenges) and/or between new partners (from different regions, economies etc.). These 
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policies often depart from territorial and/or relational proximity and try to increase functional 
proximity through policy interventions. 
 
1. The “speeding-up” policies could provide additional leverage to tackle common BSN 
challenges, especially as BSN has already established several incentives/funding 
schemes for fostering transnational research and innovation in the region and 
cooperation in the specific areas of scientific excellence, but also supporing the further 
utilisation of R&I infrastructure and mobility. As specific incentive mechanisms, we can 
propose the creation of a common service area by virtual service centres, shared 
service centres, but also the BSR 2nd best funding facility for the project proposals that 
receive very good evaluations but fail to receive the funding from two-phase 
programmes of H2020 (e.g. ERC, SME, Teaming) while being highly relevant for the 
region as a whole. The criteria, the selection committee, the institutional set-up, etc. 
could be worked out at the level of BSN. 
 
2. In the case of top-down policies aimed at wider BSR challenges, where the mere 
reliance on bottom-up initiatives for cooperation may be insufficient, the creation of 
BSR societal-challenges initiatives (e.g. in environment, energy, health) is required: 
either joint grants or coordinated policy initiatives with national and regional divisions 
of labour, i.e. different but complementary (as agreed and coordinated) RDI focuses 
and types of funded activities in different countries or regions of BSR. The creation of 
the BSR breakthrough accelerator allowing RDI grants for cooperative exploratory 
and/or high-risk and high-return projects in new upcoming interdisciplinary fields, 
such as cyber security, big data, smart cities, bioeconomy, etc., where cooperation at 
the level of BSR would be essential to create critical mass to compete globally (could 
again be jointly organised grants with common pot or topic-level coordination of 
different national policy initiatives and instruments); creation of BSR as a “common 
service area” to engage different actors in common diffusion- or application-oriented 
activities.  
 
The developments in the aforementioned areas would potentially promote BSR as a role model 
in advancements of specific (niche) research areas and building the specific institutional 
capacities and scientific excellence. 
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Introduction 
In spite of the increasing research capabilities in EU13 countries and the increasing co-
publication rates with the old EU members (Makkonen and Mitze 2016), one of the key policy 
challenges of research collaborations in the European Research Area (ERA) has to do with the 
relatively low and even decreasing levels of participation of EU13 countries within FPs. In 2016, 
a public hearing held in the European Parliament on closing the success and participation rate 
gap in FPs concluded that the “EU13 participation in H2020 is still very low and without 
intervention this trend is likely to continue.” According to the recent H2020 midterm 
evaluation, the low participation of EU13 countries is a persistent reality (136). However, 
besides studies reporting lower participation and success rates (number of granted projects, 
funding etc.), there have been relatively few reports investigating more closely the 
geographical distribution or pattern of participations from EU13 countries across different FP 
themes, applications and projects. There have also been opinions expressed about the BSR 
cooperation, which began to develop independently from the EU, but has been lacking a 
common goal and therefore been stagnating since the EU accession was accomplished 
(Schymik and Krumrey 2009). 
 
This report analyses the participation dynamics in ERA and BSR RDI initiatives and searches 
for policy ideas and innovations for widening the participation of strong and moderate-
innovator countries of BSR and beyond. This study covers the following “innovation leaders” 
and “strong-innovator” countries of BSR: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany (the following 
Länder: Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern1). The moderate-innovator 
countries covered in the study are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In this report the first 
two groups are jointly referred to as “innovation leaders” and the last group “moderate 
innovators”. 
 
This analysis takes a bottom-up perspective while analyzing the participation of researchers 
in the cooperative programmes related to ERA and BSR because there is no common single 
agency dominating the scene, and the analysis does not focus on a single programme, but 
rather attempts to draw conclusions based on a set of different policy instruments and 
programmes. 
 
The empirical analysis relies upon the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data 
sources and research methods to increase the validity of the research results. A concept of 
segregation (meaning separation or sorting) is applied as a summary measure characterising 
the development of the integration of BSR/EU13-region science systems into ERA and BSR 
(thematic) networks. The focus is on analyzing individual choices and strategies of core RDI 
actors (researchers and research groups/institutions) that lead to the segregation (as opposed 
to integration) of researchers and research groups in different RDI projects funded and carried 
out in ERA in general and BSR more specifically. As the outcomes of segregation are measured 
                                               
1 While Germany as a whole is categorised as an “innovation leader” in the European Innovation Scoreboard, the EU’s 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard categorises these regions as “strong innovators”. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/regional_de. 
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on the “macro” level (mostly country or, in the case of Germany, also regional level), the study 
also incorporates interviews and focus groups with RDI performers (especially researchers) to 
corroborate whether the barriers synthesised from the literature and defined by the 
quantitative analysis of this study are also raised by the RDI performers themselves. Given the 
limited time and resources, we have conducted primary interviews and focus groups in Estonia 
with its most active and succesful (in terms of applying and receiving EU RDI funding) 
researchers from different discplines (see Appendix 2). Estonia can be considered one of the 
more active and successful EU13 countries in Horizon 2020 and in BSR. During the interviews 
and focus groups we asked the researchers for their perceptions regarding: 
 
- Their personal motivations, incentives and main barriers to joining transnational 
cooperation projects; 
- Main differences between how projects and consortia have been formed in FP7 vs 
Horizon2020; 
- Whether BSR forms a “functional” region within ERA and global research networks. 
 
The perceptions of Estonian researchers have been corroborated by secondary interviews with 
policy makers, industry stakeholders and experts from other BSR countries. Further studies 
should also look for similar feedback from the research groups of other BSR member states. 
1. Policy Instruments for RDI Cooperation in ERA and BSR 
This chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
• What policy instruments determine the cooperation within BSR? 
• What are the existing instruments and programmes and how are they coordinated; 
what internal logic do they follow and what kind of institutions/countries participate? 
• What are the examples of instruments and programmes with a wider impact on 
cooperation? 
1.1. The rationales and challenges of regional RDI cooperation 
On the level of RDI systems, regional RDI collaboration is often seen as a panacea for many 
ills: creating critical mass of supply and demand factors for sustainable RDI activities; creating 
spaces for knowledge spill-overs and technology transfer, socio-economic development and 
convergence; increasing the collective competitiveness of regional actors vis-à-vis other 
regions of the world etc. On the level of RDI performers, especially researchers and research 
groups, the key incentives for participation in different joint RDI efforts (such as ERA) may be 
summed up as follows: obtaining research funding and sharing costs; networking and finding 
new partners; advancing personal careers for researchers; developing technology, knowledge, 
research excellence (especially in areas with thematic synergies and functional proximity); 
commercialisation of research outputs (Polt et al. 2009, 28; Reale et al. 2013; Lepori et al. 
2011, 2014. See also, e.g., Hakala et al. 2002; Pohoryles 2002; Enger and Castellacci 2016). 
 
It should be fairly logical that some of these systemic effects as well as actor-level incentives 
can be created or reinforced by policies, especially through funding allocations, while others 
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may be more natural occurrences existing even when there are no policies in place. Thus, 
previous policy analyses of FPs have often come to contradictory conclusions regarding the 
key rationales and incentives for transnational research cooperation. Several evaluations, 
especially since FP6, have argued that the incentives related to the development of 
networking, knowledge and research capabilities tend to be more important than the 
economic/financial incentives.2 This has been especially emphasised in the case of EU’s joint 
programming activities, where networking effects have been significant (windows to enter 
into new or extending existing international partner networks; entrance to already established 
and institutionalised networks, i.e. through ERA-NETs; Reale 2013, 20-22; Updated Policy 
Brief … 2016; European Commission 2016a); however, others have shown that already 
established networks and consortia tend to be less open to new partners and extending their 
networks towards new actors (Doussineau 2014, 7). It has been also argued that a relatively 
strong preference for EU research partnerships has been more common amongst smaller 
European countries (Okubo and Zitt 2004; Tijssen 2008). Finally, more recent studies of 
stakeholder perceptions show that the lagging growth of national RDI funding has made 
financial incentives and fund raising much more important for research organisations 
(European University Association 2016). FP funding seems to also substitute the resources 
from other (national) funding sources in old member states. In Central and Eastern European 
countries, FP funding tends to compensate for the less developed infrastructure and is seen 
as a viable option for increasing regional innovativeness of these regions in combination with 
other policies (Varga and Sebestyén 2016). 
 
Regional innovation studies have further shown that transnational cooperation and cross-
border synergies depend not only on geographical closeness (physical proximity), but also on 
the partner’s innovation and knowlege generation capacities and substantive 
complementarities to carry out research and innovation activities on sufficient levels (of 
academic excellence, technology readiness or market competitiveness) with a focus on areas 
or issues that attract other regional actors to join forces (functional proximity) and on the 
compatibility of institutional and governance structures and cultures of different regions, 
which reduces transaction costs and cultural barriers (relational proximity) (Lundquist and 
Trippl 2013; Boschma 2005; Tõnurist and Kattel 2016). In other words, the existence of a 
region as a geographical location or “space” alone is not a sufficient condition for synergetic 
transnational cooperation; it also takes some “natural” reason, capabilities or incentives as 
well as cultural fit (Scherngell and Lata 2013). In cases when the latter aspects are not 
sufficiently present, physical proximity may result in segregation (or unbalanced integration) 
within a particular region. 
 
BSR is one of the EU’s regions with a strong potential for not only physical, but also functional 
and relational proximity. Thus, it could benefit from transnational cooperation and cross-
border synergies, and this makes it also logical that both the EU and national policy makers 
have sought to foster regional collaboration in RDI. Prior studies have shown that while these 
                                               
2 This is especially interesting in the context, where research funding as such appeared as the number-one objective 
for research centres and universities to participate in FP5 and in EU15 (incl. Austria, Finland, Ireland), see Astrom 
(2012), 23; Polt et al. (2009), 65. See also Pohoryles (2002); Barber et al. (2006). 
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policy efforts have grown more systemic, there are still important challenges in designing 
policies that satisfy all, or at least most, regional actors: 
 
- The analysis carried out by Technopolis on cross-border cooperation in BSR stated in 
2011 that most actors prefer bilateral or focused cooperation between few partners 
over cooperation through platforms that cover the entire region (Technopolis 2011). 
- Jauhiainen argued in 2014 that RDI collaboration policies have been mostly driven by 
an idealistic win-win logic that overlooks the diversities of BSR in terms of functional 
capacities: “… in these more advanced cross-border co-operation projects the focus 
has often been on similarities in integration or in finding perfect matching with 
functional complementarities in economic activities. The difference across the borders 
has not been used as a trigger (Jauhiainen 2014). 
- Tõnurist and Kattel (2016) have implicitly argued that there seems to be much more 
functional proximity between the EU15 countries than between EU13 and EU15 
countries. This also translated into how policy makers from the EU15 and the EU13 
countries perceive the main opportunities for and barriers to RDI cooperation in the 
region (Tõnurist and Kattel 2016). 
 
Despite the rather close physical but also relational proximity (perhaps a still somewhat wider 
distance in governance structures and culture), we identify 5 strategic policy challenges that 
have influenced both functional proximity and the effectiveness of the BSR-based RDI 
collaboration policies: 
 
First, it is highly likely in the case of most regions that relational and locational proximity is 
much higher in scope and depth than functional proximity, as not all RDI challenges will be 
of common interest for all regional actors. In other words, functional proximity is not so much 
a regional and nation-level characteristic, but potentially a domain-specific phenomenon. 
 
Second, the emergence of collaboration initiatives in BSR through a history of rather ad-hoc 
actions on different governance level (science-driven bilateral, regional, EU) has created a 
rather vast and complex system of different institutions, policy and RDI networks and 
instruments that partly overlap (in rationales, target groups, funding etc.), but may at the 
same time cover only some parts of the broader region (either geographically or in terms of 
RDI domains). 
 
Third, national and regional interests and priorities are challenged by global drivers of RDI. 
The concept of scientific excellence is a borderless notion driven by global scientific 
breakthroughs and collective curiosity and search. Modern innovation dynamics are 
characterised not so much by competition between national economies and regions, but 
increasingly by competition between global value chains (GVCs) and their respective 
production and innovation networks (see here also Coenen et al. 2017). Thus, functional 
proximity may also be increasingly superseded by global trends and drivers. 
 
Fourth, differences in actual RDI capabilities of different countries/regions may lead to 
different interests regarding RDI cooperation: more developed regions may be interested in 
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building collective critical mass for global competitiveness, whereas less developed regions 
may be interested in intra-regional convergence and catching-up effects. Especially the latter 
challenge seems to lead to different expectations regarding the model of RDI policy 
governance of BSR as a whole: a bottom-up and open-ended governance system to aid the 
collective search for globally competitive regional RDI specialisations (and functional 
proximity) vs a more strategically determined and planned system to foster RDI convergence 
and catching-up as part of regional RDI cooperation. The former model assumes the existence 
of the critical mass of RDI capabilities that is necessary to take the further steps through 
cooperation while the latter model focuses primarily on creating the critical mass of RDI 
capabilities through de-facto asymmetrical cooperation of regional actors with different levels 
of capabilities. These two expectations co-exist in the EU RDI policies (Horizon 2020 and 
national policies) as well as in regional policies (European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF) financed and national initiatives); and both of these policies aim to simultaneously 
improve both intra-EU convergence and the competitiveness of the EU as a whole. 
 
Fifth, while the EU, national and regional policy makers try to set best strategies and 
coordinate the actions of different governance levels, the perceptions and actions of scientists 
and innovators working in this multi-level arena of RDI policies are as important in 
determining the actual content and implementation of strategies and policies. In innovation 
research, it has become relatively common to talk about the combined impact of “policy 
mixes” co-created by the EU, regional and national policies and initiatives. Recent meta-
evaluations of the EU’s innovation policy efforts argue that it is almost impossible to measure 
and show the impact of single policy instrument on innovation (Manchester Institute of 
Innovation Research 2012). The same researchers and innovators often implement several 
policy instruments in parallel (grants with different rationales and conditions) and therefore 
give their own meaning and direction to these instruments. 
 
Taking into account these challenges, this study analyses the dynamics of cross-border RDI 
cooperation in the BSR, tries to identify the success factors as well as the main barriers to 
such cooperation, tries to identify policy instruments that have fostered cooperation, as well 
as offer recommendations for improving such cooperation on the EU level as well as in EU15 
and EU13 countries. 
 
In sum: 
• Transnational cooperation in BSR should not be taken as granted only because of the 
close physical proximity. The effectiveness of the BSR-based RDI collaboration policies 
tends to be increasingly dependent on the ability to cope with the challenges of 
sustaining functional proximity that is driven by domain-specifity as opposed to 
regional and/or nation-state specific interests and dynamics. 
• The key challenges in facilitating RDI cooperation in BSR are strongly dependent on 
different aims/rationales of RDI that stem from the differences in the development 
stages of innovation systems of the region as well as from the global and EU-level 
developments in RDI that sometimes dominate over the drivers of functional 
proximity. 
18 
 
• The interplay of several factors (institutions, incentives, policies etc.) has led to the 
situation where financial incentives play an increasingly important role in guiding 
transnational cooperation of RDI performers in BSR countries. 
1.2. Policy instruments and the institutional context of RDI 
cooperation in ERA and BSR 
A substantial number of different intergovernmental, transnational and supra-national RDI 
networks and institutions exist in the BSR that follow different modes of governance and 
rationales for cooperation. Lepori et al. (2011; 2014) have provided a framework to analyse 
the degrees of integration and institutional logics of European (joint) RDI programmes by 
distinguishing 3 policy-level variables that influence how different initiatives function in 
practice: a) policy rationales and goal setting practices (including specific priorities and 
legitimacy for this kind of cooperation); b) organisational or managerial models (from 
delegation to single national agencies to transitory coordinating structures, such as joint 
decision‐making committees and supranational funding agencies); c) funding sources and 
their management practices (common pot vs national pot; Lepori et al. 2011, 2014). Departing 
from the challenge of fostering EU15/EU13 integration in the BSR, Tõnurist and Kattel (2016) 
have argued that given the extent of divergence of RDI capabilities, the directionality of 
cooperation can be multi- vs unidirectional, running from emulation and lesson-drawing to 
transnational problem solving; from formal and informal coercion to international 
harmonisation and policy promotion (Tõnurist and Kattel 2016). 
 
Overall, we can distinguish three models of RDI policy cooperation, as depicted in Table 1. 
Model 1 (integration logic) refers to the transfer of competencies from a national to a higher 
institutional level, together with which a certain level of power disparity and centralisation of 
decision-making processes also occurs. In contrast, Model 3 (collaboration logic) relies upon 
decentralication strategy, whereby national actors/partners act as the dominant actors on an 
ad-hoc basis and often for a limited time. There are no significant power disparities that 
would allow imposing policy choices on each other. Model 2 (coordination logic) entails certain 
elements to form a more lasting relationship between cooperation partners. 
Table 1 Institutional logic for joint programmes 
 Model 1 
Integration and 
vertical convergence 
Model 2 
Coordination and 
horizontal convergence 
Model 3 
Decentralised 
collaboration  
Underlying rationale and 
legitimacy 
Concentration and 
integration in 
transnational arenas 
to achieve a critical 
mass 
Cooperation and 
competition in multi-
level policy arenas; 
Subsidiarity: to capture 
benefits of each national 
system and to create 
learning effects from 
transnational 
cooperation 
Promoting research 
collaboration to 
strengthen the national 
research basis; 
Decentralisation strategy 
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 Model 1 
Integration and 
vertical convergence 
Model 2 
Coordination and 
horizontal convergence 
Model 3 
Decentralised 
collaboration  
Convergence 
mechanisms 
Vertical 
convergence via 
international 
harmonisation 
(multidirectional) 
and/or coercion 
(unidirectional) 
Horizontal convergence 
via transnational 
communication, 
transnational problem-
solving; 
Multi-directional 
Horizontal convergence, 
either via unidirectional or 
multidirectional 
cooperation oriented on 
emulation & lesson-
drawing 
Organisational model Joint programmes 
managed by a 
supranational 
agency that is fully 
in charge of all 
programme 
functions 
Joint programming 
initiatives with variable 
geometry and levels of 
commitment 
Ad-hoc agreements 
between national funding 
agencies; light and 
transient structure for 
joint decision‐making 
Funding model Common pot (no 
national return 
rules) 
National‐pot or national 
pot with EU top‐up 
funding 
National pot 
Funding source National budget 
based on fixed 
contribution or 
European budget 
National budget, 
possibly with additional 
EU contribution 
National budgets 
Source: Authors adapted version from Lepori et al. 2011; 2014; Tõnurist and Kattel 2016. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the main existing instruments and their logic in supporting 
cross-border and transnational cooperation and networking in BSR. A detailed overview 
(including references the Table is derived from) is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
The transnational policy initiatives of BSR have strong roots in horizontal coordination type 
cooperation initiatives (e.g. CBSS, HELCOM; see Kern 2011). Yet, it has also been argued that 
the considerable variety and overlap of initiatives and institutions are indicative of a lacking 
political will to set up a coherent policy mix for the BSR and “it is much easier to set up 
institutions than to get them working properly” (Bengtsson 2009, 6).3 The more bottom-up-
driven policy evolutions have resulted in competition between very specific interests and 
agendas of different nation-states (Jouanneau and Raakjær 2014). As a result, most 
innovation-related cooperation is said to be short-term and project-based (Jauhiainen 2014, 
64; Technopolis 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 At the policy-making level, the aforementioned problems are said to be overestimated, see Vitola (2015). 
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Table 2 Overview of the main instruments and their logic to support cooperation in ERA and 
BSR 
Level of 
coordination  
Main 
instruments  
Key examples The mode of governance and level 
of integration 
Global level  Not explored in this study 
Supra-
national level 
The EU, incl. 
the European 
Research Area 
FP7 and H2020 Supranational state model 
Supra-
national level 
The EU, incl. 
the ERA 
PPP Partnerships: JTI Integration and vertical 
convergence 
P2P Partnerships: JPI Coordination 
P2P Partnerships: Art. 185 
BONUS and BONUS+ 
Integration and coordination 
P2P Partnerships: ERA-NETs Coordination (multi-directional), 
whereas financial integration has 
increased 
Widening Participation, e.g. 
ERA-Chairs, Twinning, 
Teaming 
Collaboration/coordination 
(strongly unidirectional) 
Supra-
regional level 
 
The macro-
regional 
cooperation in 
the EU 
EU Strategy for the BSR – 
EUSBSR 
 
  INTERREG Some level of vertical convergence 
due to reliance on the EU Structural 
Funds 
  EC Smart Specialisation S3 
in BSR 
 
Meta-
regional level 
 STRING Collaboration (multidirectional) 
Regional level Inter-
governmental 
cooperation 
and 
transnational 
policy-making 
networks 
Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) & Nordic 
Council of Ministries (NCM) 
(incl. NordForsk) 
Collaboration/ coordination 
(multidirectional); horizontal or 
vertical convergence (depends on 
the specific cooperation network in 
question) 
 Inter-
organisational 
cooperation 
and networks 
in the region, 
incl. bi- and 
multilateral 
collaboration 
programmes 
Baltic Sea Region University 
Network (BSRUN); NOVA 
University Network, BOVA 
University Network; Baltic 
University Programme (BUP) 
Collaboration and horizontal 
convergence (multidirectional) 
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Level of 
coordination  
Main 
instruments  
Key examples The mode of governance and level 
of integration 
Regional level  E.g. EEA and Norwegian-
Estonian Research 
Cooperation 
Collaboration and horizontal 
convergence (primarily 
unidirectional) 
 E.g. bilateral Estonia-Latvia 
cross-border cooperation 
Collaboration 
(multidirectional)/coordination 
(some level of vertical convergence)  
 
According to Table 2, the rationales for cooperation in BSR are varied, from capacity building 
and emulation to advancing scientific excellence together with strong thematic focuses in the 
ERA. In addition, the table above reveals that regional cooperation in BSR is to a large extent 
related to the EU initiatives (funding sources or other incentives for cooperation). This also 
means that several BSR-focused initiatives do not have a sustainable organisational 
mechanism in place, especially when they rely on external funding sources. The EU-facilitiated 
cooperation tends to favour integration and vertical convergence as a prime logic and 
organisational mechanism for cooperation. Although EU-funded policy and funding 
instruments are based on a variety of different models, there is a growing concentration (if 
judged by the models underlying new instruments within H2020) towards the integration 
model. The meta-regional and regional instruments in BSR follow coordination and 
decentralised collaboration models. This implies that there is stronger integration towards 
the EU compared to BSR visible in the set-up of instruments. 
 
On the positive side, a number of studies highlight that the Europeanisation of RDI policies 
and EU-level strategy-making processes may have been an additional driver for transnational 
cooperation in the region, especially in the environmental and maritime issues (Kern 2011; 
Bengtsson 2009, 6-7; Kern and Gänzle 2013). These studies acknowledge that the increased 
role of the EU in the region may have had a twofold effect: 
 
a) it may have supported the adoption of a more dynamic and coherent multi-level 
governance model in the region, 
b) but it may also have further intensified the coordination problems between different 
organisations and government levels inside the region and between the EU and 
regional levels.4 
 
Further, European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) are an important driver of RDI 
cooperation in the region, especially in the case of EU13 member states. According to the 
previous studies, during 2007-2013, ca 2/3 of the ESIF of the BSR were concentrated in the 
Baltic States and Poland, where they have been used as a substitute for national funding of 
core RDI activities, as well (Jauhiainen 2014; Technopolis 2011; Vitola 2015). In the Nordic 
countries, the EU funds have been more oriented towards different EU joint initiatives such as 
                                               
4 For example, some argue that the success of the BONUS progamme stems from its relatively long continuity, 
reinforced by the EU’s institutional guarantees for coordination between states, but the full integration (in particular, 
the real common pot) is perceived rather negatively by different stakeholders due to the juste retour problems. See 
Burbridge et al. (2014), 7-8, 38, 57. 
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ERA-NETs, Art 185 (Tõnurist and Kattel 2016, 6). The impact of the recent financial crisis and 
subsequent austerity trends have only increased this division, as the countries hit hardest by 
the crisis have been even more prone to substituting national funding with ESIF and hopes for 
H2020 success (Veugelers 2014). This has created threats that especially EU13 may be 
undercutting its basic RDI capabilities that are a necessary precondition for functional 
proximity driven RDI cooperation. 
In sum: 
• According to the internal logics of RDI-cooperation-supporting instruments, three 
types or models can be distingushed: integration, coordination and collaboration. 
• Although the EU-funded policy and funding instruments are based on a variety of 
different models, there is a growing concentration towards the integration model. The 
meta-regional and regional instruments in BSR follow coordination and decentralised 
collaboration models. This implies that there is stronger integration towards the EU 
compared to BSR visible in the set-up of instruments. 
• In BSR countries, the ESIF instruments have been used rather differently. In Nordic 
states, these focus more on the integration of ERA; in the Baltic States and Poland, 
these focus more on building up the capabilities of their national research systems 
and are used as substitutes to national instruments. 
• The variety of policy instruments available in BSR has created more funding 
opportunities for individual RDI actors, but also added difficulties to steer the 
cooperation towards stronger functional proximity and maintain the coherence of RDI 
systems. 
1.3. Funding of R&D cooperation in BSR 
Considering the overall R&D funding, BSR as a region has substantially increased its total R&D 
funding to almost 37 billion euros in 2014, thus forming 11.4% of total EU expenditures. 
Leaving out the three German Länder, the rest of the BSR has grown in terms of R&D 
expenditure from 26 to nearly 34 billion euros (Table 3). 
 
This growth has been driven by Sweden, Denmark and Germany, as in Finland, R&D 
expenditure continued to increase during the crisis years but reversed afterwards when both 
government and business investments started to decline (OECD 2017). Among the EU13 
members, Poland and Lithuania have also increased their investments into R&D, but in Estonia 
and Latvia, similarly to Finland, a decline after the crisis is seen (following a small rise in 
Estonia in 2015). However, the historic top investment levels in those countries have been still 
not achieved later. In Latvia, decreasing business expenditure while government spending has 
increased causes this; in Estonia, besides business investments also government investments 
into R&D have decreased more recently. 
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Table 3 Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD, Million eur) 
GEO/ TIME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DK 5871 6701 7066 7093 7299 7590 7686 7869 8054 
DE (3 Länder) NA NA NA NA 3909 NA NA 4190 NA 
EE 174 208 197 233 384 381 326 287 303 
LV 126 142 85 109 141 147 140 163 152 
LT 233 258 224 220 283 298 332 377 387 
PL 1764 2194 2096 2608 2836 3430 3436 3864 4317 
FI 6243 6871 6787 6971 7164 6832 6684 6512 6071 
SE 11608 12314 10683 11870 13157 13891 14406 13612 14581 
Total NA NA NA NA 35174 NA NA 36874 NA 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT 
 
Of the total BSR, Sweden invests 36.9% into research and development, Denmark 21.3% and 
Finland 17.7% (Figure 1), Poland and the three German states contribute similarly close to 
11%, and the financial capacity of the Baltic States is still marginal (1% Lithuania, 0.8% Estonia 
and 0.4% Latvia). As the analysis in subsequent chapters will show, the activity level 
(participations, funding shares etc. comparatively to the sizes of the research systems) of 
Baltic countries in different BSR (but also EU) cooperation programmes is much larger 
compared to the financial capabilities of their innovation systems. 
 
 
Figure 1 Share of countries in total R&D expenditure of BSR region in 2014 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT 
 
It is evident that the R&D systems in different countries depend on the international (abroad) 
funding to a different degree. Especially for the EU13, international funding sources (e.g. 
Horizon 2020 projects, including other instruments in Table 2, international business 
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contracts, funding from international organisations etc.) are increasingly important. On 
average, the EU13 country group finances 22-24% and the EU15 country group 11-13% of 
their R&D expenditure from abroad (Figure 14 and Figure 15 in the Appendix). In the EU15 
countries belonging to BSR, the funding level from abroad is highest in Finland (17%) followed 
by Sweden and Denmark (ca 7%) and Germany as a whole (ca 4-5%). As the countries report 
ESIF sources differently among intramural and abroad R&D funding types, the dependence of 
EU13 countries (especially the Baltic States and Poland) can be even larger, considering the 
focus of ESIF on R&D in these countries. 
 
More specifically, also the Horizon 2020 contributions play different roles in different 
countries (within the funding from abroad; see Figure 16 and Figure 17 in Appendix 2). As 
expected, H2020 is more important for smaller member states, where it is comparable (as 
total EU contribution for the period 2014-2016) to the annual amounts of total funding from 
abroad (Denmark), or even higher (Estonia). The relative importance of Horizon 2020 in the 
international funding is still higher in the EU15 countries, especially in the BSR region. Among 
moderate innovators, it is very high in Estonia and much lower in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
The magnitude of EU funds has grown for the BSR region as a whole (Table 4), and this trend 
is observable also in areas that can be considered core topics of BSR (environment, energy, 
maritime research etc.). Widening instruments have become less relevant for the whole BSR 
region, but ERA-NETs, for example, have gained in importance compared to the period of 
2007-2013. 
 
Larger regional-level programmes have often started as a single project (BONUS ERA-NET and 
BSR InnoNet) and grown into programmes of a much larger scale, like BONUS EEIG with a 
budget of 100 million eur for 2014-2017 and BSR Stars with a budget of 280 million for 2014-
2017 (integrated with INTERREG). This observation for BSR coincides with Lepori et al.’s (2014) 
conclusion that the EC practice of establishing a set of instruments enabling different levels 
of integration (from ERA-NET to ERA-NET plus to Art 185) was a good strategy, allowing the 
integration to evolve compared to the alternative approach of stronger commitments that are 
the pre-conditions for, e.g., intergovernmental treaties. This is particularily important in BSR 
cooperation, due to varying financial capabilities among the countries involved. 
 
The smaller (university) networks, e.g. BUP (with 74 member universities from BSR countries 
plus Ukraine, Belarus, the Chech Republic, Slovakia), are relevant for networking, teaching, 
mobility of students etc., but much smaller in scale and financial relevance. Sometimes these 
have a narrower thematic focus, e.g. NOVA (The Nordic Forestry, Veterinary and Agricultural 
University Network with 6 member universities) and BOVA (The Baltic Forestry, Veterinary and 
Agricultural University Network with 4 member universities) are focused mainly on education 
cooperation and mobility in specific fields, but also organise joint activities. Being historically 
among the first networking platforms for several universities, they are still considered relevant 
by the interviewees. However, the increasing number of networking possibilities outside these 
networks, together with often constrained human and financial resources, have reduced their 
relevance over time, causing also smaller and varying budgets, which often consist of different 
fundraising activities and project applications. More recently, discussions have started among 
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the members about the potential of these networks to enable scaling up the small focused 
research groups in both Baltic and Nordic countries through combining their research 
capacities for larger-scale project applications and activities. The relevance of these 
instruments is thus still underestimated by financial figures only, as besides functional 
proximity these networks increase relational proximity in BSR. 
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Table 4 Overview of the funding of main instruments to support cooperation in the Baltic Sea region 
Level of 
coordination 
Instruments 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Supra-
national level 
(EU, ERA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Societal 
Challenges 
1666.8 (ENV – Environment (including Climate Change) 168.4, 
SSH – Socio-economic sciences and Humanities 71.9, KBBE – 
Food, Agriculture, and Biotechnology 215.0, HEALTH 551.3, 
SEC – Security 163.6, ENERGY 266.4, TPT – Transport (including 
Aeronautics) 230.3) 
1014.5 (ENERGY – Secure, clean and efficient 
energy 241.9, ENV – Climate action, 
environment, resource efficiency and raw 
materials 140.8, FOOD – Food security, 
sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine 
and maritime and inland water research 
131.0, HEALTH – Health, demographic change 
and wellbeing 226.5, SECURITY – Secure 
societies – Protecting freedom and security of 
Europe and its citizens 51.8, SOCIETY – 
Europe in a changing world – inclusive, 
innovative and reflective Societies 41.9, TPT – 
Smart, green and integrated transport 180.5) 
 
Excellent 
Science 
1240.1 (ERC – European Research Council 618.0, INFRA – 
Research Infrastructures 161.8, PEOPLE – Marie-Curie Actions 
460.3) 
785.6 (ERC – European Research Council 
317.2, FET – Future and Emerging 
Technologies 69.6, INFRA – Research 
infrastructures 115.7, MSCA – Marie 
Sklodowska-Curie actions 283.0) 
 
Industrial 
Leadership 
1095.7 (NMP – Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies, Materials and 
new Production Technologies 375.2, SPA – Space 60.0, ICT – 
Information and Communication Technologies 660.5) 
436 (Leadership in enabling and industrial 
technologies (LEIT) 422.7, RISKFINANCE – 
Access to risk finance 0.4, SME – Innovation in 
SMEs 12.8) 
 
SWAF 
 
 
 
 
 
32.3 (Science in Society) 17.6 (CAREER – Make scientific and 
technological careers attractive for young 
people 4.9, GENDEREQ – Promote gender 
equality in research and innovation 3.9, GOV – 
Develop the governance for the advancement 
of responsible research and innovation 4.6, 
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Level of 
coordination 
Instruments 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Supra-
national level 
(EU, ERA) 
(Continues) 
 
SWAF 
(Continues) 
INEGSOC – Integrate society in science and 
innovation 3.1, RESACCESS – Develop the 
accessibility and the use of the results of 
publicly-funded research 0.0, SCIENCE – 
Encourage citizens to engage in science 0.1, 
SWAFS-CROSST – Science with and for Society 
– Cross-theme 0.8) 
Other 404 (General Activities 11.4, Joint Technology Initiatives 220.3, 
Nuclear Fission and Radiation Protection 39.6, Fusion Energy 0.3, 
Research for the benefit of SMEs 132.5) 
42.6 (without pillars in eCORDA)  
incl PPP (JTI) 220.3 139.5  
incl P2P (JPI)  8.4 (PCP 4.8, COFUND-PCP 3.6)  
Incl P2P (Art 
185) 
BONUS ERA NET 
3.3 (2003-
2008) 
BONUS+ 22    
BONUS EEIG 100 
Supra-
regional level 
SEWP 126.5 (INCO – Activities of International Cooperation 7.1, 
REGIONS – Regions of Knowledge 22.4, COH – Coherent 
development of research policies 1.7, REGPOT – Research 
Potential 95.3) 
45.9 (Era-Chairs:14.6; NCP 0.8; Twinning 
11.9; Teaming 18.1; Cross-theme 0.5, 
NCPNET – Transnational networks of National 
Contact Points 0.8) 
 
ERA-NETs 29.2 (CSA-ERANET 0.2, CSA-ERA-PLUS 28.9: ENV CSA-ERA-PLUS 
0.5, SOCIETY CSA-ERA-PLUS 7.8, INFRA CSA-ERANET 0.2, FOOD 
CSA-ERA-PLUS 1.9, General CSA-ERA-PLUS 2.5, LEIT CSA-ERA-
PLUS 0.4, ENERGY CSA-ERA-PLUS 5.0, TPT CSA-ERA-PLUS 1.7, 
ERA CSA-ERA-PLUS 0.3) 
ERA-NET-Cofund 58.6 (Excellent Science 3.2, 
Industrial Leadership 2.7, Science with and for 
Society 0.7, Societal Challenges 52.0) 
 
EUSBSR BSR InnoNet 2.4 (FP6), BSR-CBP 0.3 StarDust 6.5+9 BSR Stars 278.6, INTERREG 359 (overlap 66.6 as of mid-
2015) INTERREG INTERREG 302 (total programme) 
S2E  Coordination instrument 
Meta-
regional 
STRING  4.2 (additional to BSR/INTERREG) 
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Level of 
coordination 
Instruments 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Regional CBSS NA 
NCM, incl 
NordForsk 
NA (annually NORDFORSK ca 145) 
BSRUN Membership fees only (estimated annual budget 0.026)6 
NOVA7 0.8 0.79 0.8 0.87 0.82 0.67 0.28 0.3 0.4 0.4 NA 
BOVA8 0.1 0.1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
BUP 6.8 6.7 8.1 6.5 5.9 3.9 4.7 5.2 5.9 NA NA 
 
 
                                               
5 Estimate based on: Nordic R&I cooperation: Achievements and Challenges – NordForsk. 
6 The budget is not available, estimate is based on annual membership fee (2017-2019) of 1000 eur and 26 signed members (although the member list on the organisation’s website 
counts 39). http://bsrun.org/sites/default/files/uploads/warsaw_12_january_2017_steering_committee_meeting.pdf. 
7 Budgets based on annual reports 2007-2016, available at https://www.nmbu.no/en/students/nova/about/documents/annual-report. 
8 Estimated budgets are composed from member fees of 18,000-23,000 eur and fundraising activities, based on reports available at http://www.bova-university.org/about/other-
public-documents. 
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Given these differences in the importance of foreign and especially EU funding mechanisms 
for RDI, a crucial issue in analysing the effectiveness of transational-cooperation-oriented RDI 
policy instruments and the overall policy mix is whether the locational proximity of a specific 
region (in this case BSR) is complemented by relational and functional proximity: 
 
• Functional proximity implies the existence of common interests (both substantive and 
financial) regarding RDI cooperation in specific RDI fields, e.g. food, health, energy, 
transport, environment, civil security, safety, maritime affairs, science and education, 
culture (Figure 2). Based on the H2020 experience so far, it can be argued that the 
functional proximity among BSR countries is more strongly seen in “excellence-
oriented” H2020 instruments compared to the “widening” instruments. 
• Relational proximity entails the coherence of incentives and rationales on the 
organisational/programme and actor levels (e.g. whether actors share similar 
rationales among themselves and with funding agencies and policy makers; Etzold and 
Gänzle 2011; see also Liuhto 2014). For example, while instruments connected to 
EUSBSR and BONUS focus on the Baltic Sea as a key object of research and cooperation, 
in other initiatives BSR is rather a place or platform for cooperation (eligible territory) 
driven less by functional proximity than political and policy imperatives.9 
 
Overall, the new EU initiatives assume greater functional and especially relational proximity 
in terms of govenance regulations and processes as, e.g., PCP and PPI Cofund activities require 
joint planning and evaluation of procurement activities (Table 12 in Appendix), which seem 
to be remaining out of the capability limits not only for Baltic States, but also for EU13 in 
general (see Figure 18 to Figure 23 in the Appendix). 
 
 
                                               
9 Burbridge et al. (2014), 49-50. 
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Figure 2 BSR cooperation in H2020 projects by thematic pillars 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. Note: The minimum number of BSR partners in a project is two. 
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In sum: 
• The dependence of National Innovation Systems of BSR countries on external funding sources 
is more than twice as large in EU13 compared to EU15 countries. 
• Based on the financial volumes (and corroborated by the interviews), the EU funding and 
respective strategies are driving much more the BSR RDI cooperation dynamics than the meta-
regional or regional instruments. 
• The functional-proximity-based cooperation in BSR is currently realised more via the so-
called “excellence-driven” EU policy instruments as opposed to the “widening” instruments, 
which focus on ohter rationales and incentives. 
• Among BSR countries, orientation towards and reliance on the H2020 funding is relatively 
larger in Denmark and Estonia. 
• EU funding has allowed the BSR instruments (e.g. BONUS, INTERREG) to evolve into larger and 
stronger commitments, which can form a potential basis for even stronger instruments (e.g. 
intergovernmental ones) in the future. 
 
2. Mapping RDI Cooperation in ERA and the Baltic Sea Region 
 
This chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
• What countries and institutions are cooperating within the ERA and Baltic Sea instruments? 
• How intense is cooperation and what is the role of institutions, enterprises? 
• What factors hinder the widening in ERA and BSR activities? 
• What factors support the creation of the ERA and BSR cooperation?  
 
2.1. Country-level cooperation patterns and integration of BSR 
Small countries seek expertise through international networks, which is necessary for scientists in 
those countries to avoid insulation in increasingly specialised fields of science (Luukkonen et al. 
1992). Therefore, small countries often try to integrate into international cooperation networks also 
more widely, which can compromise the depth of integration. As many BSR countries are small, the 
integration patterns vs isolation patterns are relevant. We use here the segregation indexes and their 
dynamics to assess whether the BSR, but especially the EU13 countries in the region, have achieved 
wider integration within ERA or BSR science cooperation (which they are aiming at) or not.10 The 
empirical results show that the segregation of BSR countries in the H2020 programme has increased 
(similarly to the total participation of EU13 countries) – the dissimilarity index has increased from 
0.61 to 0.64 (Table 5). The dissimilarity index measures the “evenness” of the distribution, showing 
the degree to which EU13 countries have concentrated in particular projects.11 Paradoxically, this 
growth of segregation has emerged while participation of EU13 members in FP has grown a little – in 
                                               
10 The methodology underlying the analysis of the integration/segregation patterns is explained in Appendix 2. 
11 There are no common rules on how to judge or interpret more broadly these indices, for example Marcińczak et al. (2015) 
suggest adapting commonly used thresholds in ethnic segregation (D < 30 indicating low and D > 60 high segregation) to a 
lower level in case of socio-economic segregation, thus D < 20 indicating low and D > 40 high segregation. Following this 
suggestion, D values show high and growing segregation/concentration levels in EU FPs along the old-new membership divide. 
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FP7, the share of this group was 7.98% and, respectively, in H2020 8.45% of all participations. Thus, 
one can conclude that while EU13 has managed to gain more funding from FP, this has not necessarily 
increased the integration of these countries within ERA. 
 
Similar results are also shown by the indexes of isolation and interaction (Table 5). The index of 
isolation expresses the probability to meet another member of the minority group (EU13 or BSR, 
respectively) within the cooperation project. It has grown between FP7 and H2020 and shows that the 
EU13 and BSR members have clustered into certain projects as opposed to widening participation 
across all types of projects or becoming critical mass members in projects they participate in. The 
index of interaction shows the probability of meeting (or being exposed to) another member of the 
majority group (EU 15 or non-BSR member, respectively). The dynamics of the index support our 
above claims of H2020 being much more complex in the governance forms of instruments requiring 
greater relational proximity, which limits the wider participation of EU13 (and hence BSR) countries. 
Table 5 Segregation index values for the EU13 and BSR participations in Framework Programmes, 
BONUS and INTERREG 
Program/Indicator  Index of dissimilarity 
(D) 
Index of isolation 
(I) 
Index of interaction 
(Int) 
EU13 FP7  0.61 0.32 0.68 
H2020  0.64 0.37 0.63 
BSR FP7  0.61 0.29 0.71 
H2020  0.64 0.37 0.63 
EU13 
 
BONUS  0.37 0.32 0.68 
INTERREG  0.27 0.38 0.62 
BSR INTERREG 0.33 0.34 0.66 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda, BONUS and INTERREG participation databases 
 
Integration is wider in the case of smaller and regionally/thematically focused programmes (index of 
dissimilarity for BONUS, INTERREG). This stems from the smaller number of participants, but also the 
higher participation rates of EU13 members (which in BONUS was 16.61% and in INTERREG 31.14%). 
However, mainly due to smaller projects and single/few participants, the probability of having other 
EU13 (moderate innovator) partners in the project remains low. 
 
The segregation indexes give only a very general assessment to the integration trend, limitations of 
the indicators are related to the fact that the underlying segregation processes are not revealed, e.g. 
how much of these general trends is attributable to the lower investment in R&D (personnel, 
infrastructures) by some country groups, less efficient R&D systems and policies, closed networks, 
but also brain-drain problems due to, e.g., salary or funding gaps (Galsworthy and McKee 2013). 
Therefore, the thematic, behavioural but also structural participation is analyzed in subsequent 
sections. 
 
The patterns of participation in H2020 vary quite significantly across country groups. In the case of 
BSR countries, it is evident that the EU13 countries are involved in H2020 projects where the average 
contribution per participant and per coordinator is lower, and they mostly participate in consortia led 
by other countries, rather than as coordinators (Figure 3). Different project budgets might also reflect 
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the varying salary levels, which, according to the interviewees, hinder taking up the role of the 
coordinator as well as create the feeling of discrimination among the project partners. 
 
Figure 3 Average funding of participation and coordination in H2020 projects 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
 
It is also evident that, in general, researchers from EU13 countries are less successful in getting 
funding for their projects, both as participants and even more so as coordinators (Figure 4). Some 
countries (Cyprus, Malta, Estonia) stand out in the EU13 group as relatively more successful as 
coordinators, but it may be that only relatively few strong applications have been handed in. The 
relevance of coordinating roles is seen rather in longer and more enduring benefits as in the 
continuance of the networks; coordinators play a special role, because there are relatively few of 
them, and they are most influencial in selecting the project members. As larger countries possess 
higher levels of inter-country collaboration partners, their role as coordinators is reinforced.12 Other 
barriers to acquire coordinator roles are discussed in Section 2.4. 
 
In general, the number of applications in H2020 decreased in all BSR countries in 2016 (Figure 26 in 
the Appendix), probably mainly caused by lower success rates. Therefore, success rates alone do not 
describe the activity levels, which, based on the interviews, tend to be an extremely relevant factor 
behind the relative success of Estonia (Figure 5). The new “reality” for applicants, which was not 
perceived by all interviewed researchers, entails writing even more applications to be successful. 
Researchers do not perceive this cost as entirely wasted, as less successful applications can be used 
to apply for other instruments (both, domestic and international). 
                                               
12  Commission analysis of September 2011, at the request of the Polish Presidency, see 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014728%202011%20INIT. 
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Figure 4 Success rates in H2020 (number of funded projects over applications) by country and role 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
As indicated by segregation indices, the participation of EU13 countries seems to remain isolated in 
thematic (BONUS) or regional (INTERREG) cooperation programmes as H2020. In the most recent 
period (2014-2020), in total 35 BONUS projects have been funded, and innovation leaders (Sweden, 
Finland Germany, Denmark) have been most active as participants and project coordinators (Figure 
27 in the Appendix). Among the moderate innovators, Estonia has coordinated 4 projects (led by 
main universities) and Poland only one industry-led project; the participations of Latvia and Lithuania 
have remained much lower. 
 
Figure 5 Number of applications to H2020 programmes per 1000 R&D employees FTE 
Source: Authors' calculations based on application data from eCORDA and total R&D personnel by sectors of 
performance, occupation and sex [Table index: rd_p_persocc] from OECD 
 
Recent studies of the impact of BONUS-funded activities between 2009 and 2016 have shown that 
the participants have achieved relatively higher visibility and productivity in their WoS-indexed 
publications compared to the general and pre-BONUS level of performance in their respective fields, 
especially marine sciences (BONUS 2017). However, as it has been generally acknowledged that 
international co-publication is more productive and visible, it cannot be properly judged what the 
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impact of BONUS programme has been, specifically in comparison to other international research 
cooperation programmes. It has been also shown that even in such small projects, as funded by 
BONUS, the share of publications from a single organisation (or country) were relatively large, 
pointing to the still more fragmented transnational cooperation. 
 
The recent INTERREG programme round shows different participation patterns again. For example, 
Poland has been more active than Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (i.e. 53 vs less than 20 participations 
in about 1.5 years; Figure 28 in the Appendix). The explanation can lie in the rather different 
orientations of partners (see also part 2.2) as well as financial commitments of the countries. 
However, considering the total funding per country, Poland receives smaller funds compared to, e.g., 
Finland (the largest beneficiary country of BSR). As could be expected, EU13 members, on average, 
receive less funding per participation (Figure 34 in the Appendix). As discussed above, ERA and BSR 
cooperation increasingly entails the instruments, where financial commitments backed by national 
funding are required (e.g. JPI, PCP etc.). Poland is the only country among BSR’s moderate innovators 
to participate in PCP Cofund activities, which points to the greater willingness and capacity to invest 
in transnational cooperation. The other moderate innovators need to increase their contributions in 
this field to enter these cooperation activities or, alternatively, they need to catch up even more in 
FP9. 
 
This brings us to the conclusion that most of the moderate-innovator countries in BSR are operating 
quite well in the instruments following the logic of decentralised collaboration (Table 1). Yet most of 
the instruments, increasingly also on the regional level (INTERREG, BONUS, STRING aimed at 
strengthening the meta-regional funding spaces (STRING 2012) and inter-organisational networks), 
are designed based on the integrated mode and require greater alignment of different actors in 
innovation systems. Thus, fragmentation of innovation systems might be a key structural weakness 
of moderate innovators for further increasing their participation in ERA activities. 
 
In sum: 
• The intensity (relative participation activity) of BSR countries in the EU and also meta-regional 
activities has increased, but the aims of wider integration of BSR and EU13 into ERA have not 
been fully realised, in spite of the “widening”-oriented instruments. This result seems to be 
robust across different funding instruments. 
• One important set of reasons for this can be the greater requirements of relational proximity 
that different instruments increasingly assume and which seems to be difficult for EU13 and 
BSR countries to achieve without structural reforms of their innovation systems. 
• The other set of reasons is related to the limited willigness of innovation systems’ actors 
(funding agencies, industry, public sector) to financially support and also participate in 
transnational cooperation initiatives together with research institutions. These differences are 
visible in respective instruments (e.g. EJP, INTERREG etc.) and are pronounced among EU13 
countries. 
• Higher success rates in H2020 instruments seem to be associated with higher application 
activity of researchers. In all BSR countries, the application rates have been increasing, but 
they are still very diverse in the range of 30-150 applications per 1000 FTE researchers 
annually. 
• Among moderate innovators, the application rates are lowest in Poland and highest in Estonia, 
followed by Latvia and Lithuania. 
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2.2. Cooperation patterns by thematic fields  
In Table 6, the segregation indexes are calculated based on the thematic fields or priorities (as far as 
these have been comparable between FP7 and H2020). Most importantly, it can be seen that the 
projects under “Spreading excellence and widening participation” have clearly reduced overall 
segregation, but at the same time increased the isolation (clustering) of EU13 countries in H2020. 
 
Table 6 Segregation index values for the EU13 participations in FP7 and H2020 by Thematic Priorities 
Thematic Field / Indicator FP7 # pro-
jects 
H2020 # pro-
jects D I Int D I Int 
Research infrastructures 0.43 0.21 0.79 341 0.47 0.17 0.83 153 
Spreading excellence and widening 
participation 
0.57 0.46 0.54 475 0.52 0.53 0.47 118 
Leadership in enabling and industrial 
technologies (LEIT) 
0.61 0.18 0.82 3914 0.67 0.28 0.72 2104 
Health, demographic change and 
wellbeing 
0.68 0.19 0.81 1006 0.67 0.24 0.76 547 
Secure, clean and efficient energy 0.61 0.21 0.79 374 0.60 0.32 0.68 624 
Smart, green and integrated transport 0.60 0.21 0.79 635 0.61 0.27 0.73 597 
Climate action, environment, resource 
efficiency and raw materials 
0.54 0.20 0.80 494 0.51 0.23 0.77 328 
Secure societies – Protecting freedom 
and security of Europe and its citizens 
0.51 0.21 0.79 319 0.57 0.27 0.73 169 
Europe in a changing world – inclusive, 
innovative and reflective societies 
0.37 0.22 0.78 253 0.47 0.26 0.74 191 
Science with and for society – cross-
theme 
0.39 0.24 0.76 183 0.39 0.25 0.75 53 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda 
The other thematic fields show increased (or similar) levels of segregation in the conditions of a 
smaller number of projects (thus confirming the results of the segregation increase on the more 
general level shown in Table 5). This again seems to imply that the H2020 measures have so far 
increased the ratio of funding allocated to EU13, but have had a more limited impact on actual 
integration between EU15 and EU13 countries. 
 
The vast differences between EU13 and EU15 become even more evident once we look at the EU 
contributions across different thematic instrument groups (we used here the so-called “Juncker’s 
priorities” four grouping policy instruments) (Figure 30 in the Appendix). In EU13 countries, widening 
instruments are more visible (Figure 31 in the Appendix) and potentially compensate the overall 
segregation. As shown in Figure 6, EU15 countries of the BSR seem to perform well in excellent 
science and societal challenges, and perhaps relatively less so in industrial leadership (compared to 
Poland, for instance). The Baltic States seem to gain proporatially more funding from societal-
challenges priorities than from the scientific-excellence pillar. 
 
More specifically, the widening-oriented instruments comprise a relatively larger number of projects 
in the EU13 countries of the BSR (especially Estonia and Poland) compared to the EU15 countries of 
the region (Sweden, Finland, Denmark; Germany does not appear in the BSR region, as the respective 
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Länder have no projects within this pillar) (Figure 32 in the Appendix). Latvia is a clear outlier here, 
as a single teaming project has had significant impact on the overall funding level; at the same time, 
Estonia has been most successful in applying for ERA chairs (Figure 33 in the Appendix). 
 
 
Figure 6 EC Contributions by H2020 thematic pillars, BSR 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
In the case of thematic instrument groups, the segregation of the BSR country group is highest in 
widening (because the innovation leaders are not actively involved in this instrument), but also in SME 
and LEIT instruments. At the same time, in the BSR region, cluster-based regional-innovation 
cooperation instruments have increased substantially (Table 4) – e.g. from BSRInno Net to BSR Stars 
within the EUSBSR strategy, but also INTERREG. As a general conclusion, one can argue that the BSR 
group has a higher degree of isolation compared to the EU13 (as it is a little smaller, too: EU13 
comprises ca 17% of HRST of EU28 and BSR ca 16%; Table 7), which suggests that for the moderate 
innovators, cooperation with other EU13 members remains still wider in the H2020 framework. 
Alternatively, it shows that thematically (functional proximity) BSR is more concentrated in H2020 
projects, which further highlights the need to discuss the policy tensions of small countries in wider 
vs deeper integration. 
 
Table 7 Segregation index values for the Baltic Sea Region participations in FP7 and H2020 by 
Thematic Priorities 
Thematic Field / Indicator FP7 H2020 
D I Int D I Int 
Research infrastructures 0.36 0.20 0.80 0.33 0.28 0.72 
Spreading excellence and widening participation 0.65 0.43 0.57 0.73 0.60 0.40 
Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies 
(LEIT) 
0.50 0.24 0.76 0.55 0.32 0.68 
Health, demographic change and well-being 0.47 0.24 0.76 0.50 0.32 0.68 
38 
 
Secure, clean and efficient energy 0.47 0.31 0.69 0.56 0.35 0.65 
Smart, green and integrated transport 0.42 0.22 0.78 0.48 0.29 0.71 
Climate action, environment, resource efficiency and 
raw materials 
0.45 0.20 0.80 0.44 0.28 0.72 
Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of 
Europe and its citizens 
0.41 0.23 0.77 0.46 0.26 0.74 
Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative and 
reflective societies 
0.37 0.21 0.79 0.50 0.26 0.74 
Science with and for society – cross-theme 0.41 0.25 0.75 0.37 0.24 0.76 
Innovation in SMEs 0.59 0.32 0.68 0.87 0.83 0.17 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
The thematic cooperation patterns showing growing segregation of thematically important fields 
elaborates the challenge for BSR in developing closer functional proximity within BSR (as discussed 
in sub-chapter 1.1). The threat that global drivers will supersede the thematic cooperation dynamics 
based on BSR thematic interests (energy, health, transportation, security) seems not to be realised in 
H2020. Based on our results, we can argue that the tension between the financial incentives of 
thematic cooperation via H2020 on one hand and the broader integration to the thematic knowledge 
base on the other seems to be solved in favour of the first motive. The internal BSR cooperation within 
the H2020 instruments has also not grown, as the values of isolation indexes are increasing between 
FP7 and H2020. 
 
In sum: 
• While the share of funding granted to the group of EU13 countries has increased in H2020 
instruments, this has had a limited impact on wider integration with the EU15 countries. 
• In the “widening”-aimed instruments, Estonia and Poland have used relatively more and 
different instruments. 
• Financial incentives of thematic cooperation seem to dominate over broader integration to 
the thematic knowledge base (achieving greater functional proximity). 
• BSR cooperation within the H2020 instruments has not grown between FP7 and H2020. 
 
2.3. Cooperation patterns by types of institutions 
The average composition of participations by institutional types across H2020 is quite different 
between EU15 vs EU13. On average, 33% of EU15 vs 26% of EU13 participants come from the higher-
education sector (HES); in addition, while 6% of EU15 partners come from the public sector (PUB), in 
EU13, public-sector participants cover almost 12% of all participants. This correlates partly also with 
the higher relevance of societal challenges vs excellence in the EU13 projects portfolio. Further, the 
EU13 has received a proportionally larger share of H2020 funding from the SME instrument (European 
Commission 2016b; European University Association 2016). Across specific countries, the structure 
of participants is still quite diverse (see Figure 7), which corresponds to the different institutional 
set-up of the innovation systems as well as the capacities of actors to participate. 
 
In most BSR countries, universities and enterprises are the main beneficiaries in H2020, which is also 
one of the characteristics of the innovation systems of these countries. Based on our interviews 
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among mainly EU13 countries, it is very difficult to draw conclusions for policy-making regarding the 
role and further potential of enterprises to participate in RDI cooperation initiatives. The firm-level 
reasons and modes of participation in RDI projects seem to be rather ad hoc and diverse, mostly to 
maximise bets for financing their own core interests. Further, the interviewed persons from the 
universities have pointed to the low capabilities and financial readiness of enterprises (especially of 
SMEs) and the lack of motivation (especially of larger companies) to be involved in transnational RDI 
cooperation projects. It was mentioned by several interviewees that public-knowledge-production-
oriented H2020 does not provide a proper format for facilitating university-industry cooperation. In 
this context, it is also logical that enterprises prefer Single Beneficiary Schemes and good researchers 
more traditional Research Actions as opposed to Innovation Actions. 
 
For example, in Estonia, only a limited fraction of companies apply for H2020 projects on a regular 
basis and have become well-known at the international level and are desirable partners in consortia 
due to the positive references. Based on the preliminary observations, it seems that the reasons for 
most active enterprises for participating in H2020 projects are more related to personal incentives 
and interests (e.g. movement of personnel from university to industry) rather than broader 
institutional context (e.g. finding targeted support for developing prototypes etc.). The latter is 
especially relevant in the context where the success of SMEs in H2020 has become increasingly 
dependent on whether the product innovation covered in the project was with a high technology 
readiness level (TRL) or not. Overall, companies seek to maximise funding, i.e. they try to game the 
system much in the same way as researchers to compensate for lacking domesting funding, but they 
are reluctant to collaborate in projects and instruments that may threaten to reveal their comparative 
advantages to competitors. Thus, while the overall incentives of researchers and entreprises may 
overlap, the selection of instruments may be rather different and inhibit further cooperation between 
industry and academia. 
 
Another interesting aspect associated with greater potential for increasing enterprise-level 
participation emerged from the case of the publicly owned firms in Estonia: the participation in 
international RDI cooperation projects has been accelerated by the requirement by the owner (the 
state) to invest 1% of turnover into R&D activities. Overall, the reluctance of the public sector to act 
as an end-user in proposals still remains an important barrier to participating in and also 
coordinating H2020 proposals. 
 
Engaging new partners from the business sector, especially amongst SMEs, is hindered (according to 
the interviewed academics) by their limited understanding of possible wider benefits of international 
cooperation and H2020 projects as well as their lack of understanding of what could be their own 
contribution in cases of lacking designated staff with direct tasks related to innovation activities. One 
additional difficulty for widening the number of companies involved in transnational cooperation has 
been identified by interviewees as the language barrier, which, especially in the case of project 
applications involving hosting foreign PhD students or scientists, is a discouraging factor for smaller 
firms to engage in international cooperation (as both written and oral communication need to be 
transferred to English). This challenge concerns Estonia and Poland according to the interviews, but 
it is potentially relevant for other moderate-innovator countries as well. 
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Figure 7 Average funding of participations and coordination in H2020 projects 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
 
A more detailed focus on BSR shows further differences between strong and moderate-innovator 
countries. Across H2020, 39% of participants have come from the higher-education sector (HES), 16% 
from research institutes (REC), 9% from the public sector (PUB), 31% from private firms (PRC) and 5% 
are other participants (OTH). As shown in Figure 8, among the moderate innovators in BSR, the 
relevance of the higher-education sector (HES) is lower than the average (from 34% in Estonia to 24% 
in Latvia), while among the strong-innovator countries of the BSR, the role of HES has been strongly 
above average (49% in Denmark and 46% in Sweden). These differences can be explained by the 
context specifity of respective innovation systems (e.g. while the Estonian system is dominated by 
universities and private firms, in Poland, public research institutes are still relevant actors). However, 
public and other sectors generally seem to have lower participation ratios (except for Latvia, where 
among generally less participation, the public sector seems more active). Of course, one has to take 
into account that there are very few actors in these sectors in smaller countries (especially moderate 
innovators). The potential of raising application activity in moderate-innovator countries is quite 
limited, as they already have much higher activity levels compared to strong innovators (see Figure 
34 to Figure 37 in the Appendix). This is caused by the fact that there are relatively few researchers 
in enterprises as well as public and third sectors in those countries. 
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Figure 8 Average funding of participations and coordination in H2020 projects (BSR region) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
 
The latter aspect becomes even more explicit in the analysis of the BONUS programme (Figure 9). It 
appears that public-sector institutions (PUB), non-governmental institutions (NGOs) and also 
professional higher-education institutions (PHE) are involved in joint projects only occasionally 
(single cases). Most BONUS projects have been formed by partners from universities (UNI), public-
sector research institutes (REC) and private firms (PRC). Further, while in innovation-leader countries 
participating in BONUS projects, universities, public-sector research organisations and companies 
are present in partnerships, in moderate-innovator countries, few companies have been involved, 
and most project participants are universities (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) or public research 
institutions (Poland, also Russia). Further, the BONUS programmes show rather strong concentration 
effects – in 3/4 of the 2014-2020 period projects, the coordinator has formed core partnerships with 
partners from the same country (Table 8). This is certainly the hindering factor for moderate 
innovators as the fragmentation of their innovation systems is generally known. 
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Figure 9. Share of participations by institution type 
Authors’ calculations based on BONUS projects (https://www.bonusportal.org/projects/) 
 
Table 8 Institutional Partnerships in BONUS 2014-2020 Projects 
 
Average number 
of partner 
institutions per 
project 
Average number of 
partners from 
coordinating country 
Share of projects with 
single institutions from 
coordinating countries 
Share of 
participations from 
moderate 
innovators 
Ecosystem  11.14 2.43 0.29 0.14 
Innovation 5.23 1.69 0.38 0.24 
Sustainable 
ecosystem 
services 
10.13 2.63 0.25 0.21 
Bluebaltic 9.43 2.71 0.0 0.08 
Overall 6.8 2.26 0.26 0.21 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BONUS project database 
 
Overall, the relative lack of partners from the public sector could be one of the reasons behind the 
relatively low assessment by users concerning the speed of uptake of scientific knowledge of BONUS 
projects into policy-making and management (BONUS 2017, 7). The low public-sector RDI 
capabilities and willingness to invest may also explain the relatively low participation of BSR 
moderate-innovator countries in the INTERREG programme (see Figure 28 and Figure 29 in the 
Appendix), which has been geared for the 2014-2020 period towards public-sector innovation-
oriented projects (see Figure 10). As this INTERREG programme is a specifically targeted one, the 
participation pattern cannot be compared to the H2020 and BONUS programmes. 
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Figure 10. Number of of participations by institution type 
Authors’ calculations based on INTERREG projects 
 
One university-sector-specific issue in BSR concerns the orchestration of the inter-institutional 
networks towards more synergy and wider BSR interests. Currently there are several networks, for 
instance BUP (Baltic University Programme); BSRUN (Baltic Sea Region University Network); NOVA (The 
Nordic Forestry, Veterinary and Agricultural University Network) and BOVA (The Baltic Forestry, 
Veterinary and Agricultural University Network). On one hand, this contributes to the institutional 
richness of the region, but on the other hand, considering the limited capabilities of the few actors 
in smaller countries, the integraton potential of those networks is under-utilised, especially 
concerning research arctivities (as our interviews with scientists revealed, they have tried to engage 
in research activities using these networks, but not successfully – the main focus of these networks 
has remained in higher-education and management activities). As the universities of moderate 
innovators increasingly engage in the activities of EU-wide university networks (LERU, GUILD, EUA) 
and these networks assume commitments from top-level management of universities, there can be 
a potential danger in weakening BSR cooperation (as can be noticed in the case of BSRUN – in 2010 
it involved 39 members, which has decreased to 26 members today). The inteviews with those 
university managers that have withdrawn from BSRUN pointed to this problem of having to be 
selective, as the human and financial resources are limited. 
 
In sum: 
• Most of the international RDI collaboration of BSR takes place through universities and 
enterprises that form the majority of participants in H2020 and BONUS. This reflects the 
structure of the innovation system of these countries, where research institutes are not so 
dominant. 
• The rationales and interests of industry from especially EU13 countries seem to be relatively 
ad hoc and difficult to generalise: companies seek to maximise funding, but are reluctant to 
collaborate in projects and instruments that may threaten to reveal their comparative 
advantages to competitors. 
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• As many funding instruments demand the inclusion of innovation users in projects, this poses 
a problem for widening the participation of moderate-innovator countries because of the 
fragmentation of their innovation systems and low capabilities of actors outside the academic 
sector for international cooperation. The weakest links in all moderate innovators seem to be 
public-sector institutions, and their low participation is especially visible in the INTERREG, a 
public-sector-oriented programme. 
• Limited capacities force the participants to be selective in cooperation projects, which implies 
that creating new cooperation forms may substitute for the old ones. 
 
2.4. Barriers to RDI cooperation in BSR and ERA: the perceptions of RDI 
performers 
As can be seen from the analysis above, there still seem to be many barriers to RDI cooperation 
between the EU15 and EU13 countries and their respective RDI performers. While relying on different 
methods and varying in their specific focuses, prior studies have rather commonly argued that as the 
EU13 countries have focused less on reforming their RDI activities and capabilities than the EU15, the 
key reasons for the low participation of EU13 in the EU funding schemes (FP7, H2020) tend to be 
structural in nature.13 This has also been visible in the BSR, where some of the EU15 countries 
(Germany and Scandinavia) seem to dominate regional cooperation mechanisms (ERA-NETs, EUSBSR, 
Bonus), and the EU13 countries remain as underrepresented as in H2020 in general.14 
 
In the context of BSR cooperation, the BSN as already mapped the main barriers to research 
cooperation in BSR and defined the main challenges to be tackled15: 
1. The purpose of research cooperation is to achieve excellent results or solve concrete 
problems – not cooperation or capacity-building for its own sake. 
2. Lack of knowledge about and overview of existing, successful research BSR cooperation 
projects. 
3. The landscape of potential funding opportunities is too crowded and confused – leading to a 
“where to start?” paralysis. 
4. The high level of administrative burdens and lack of flexibility in general when it comes to 
application for funding and compliance with reporting requirements. 
5. Insufficient local support for researchers to deal with administrative issues (from projects’ 
cradle to grave). 
6. BSR cooperation often depends on a few key individuals with long experience, personal 
networks and personal commitment, which makes BSR cooperation as such more vulnerable 
than, e.g., EU cooperation. 
                                               
13 For recent studies, see: Issue Paper … (2017), 50; European University Association (2016), 39: Ex-Post Evaluation … (2016), 
17; European Commission (2016b), 84-85, 90, 100; European Commission (2016c), 6; European Commission (2016c); 
Performance of SMEs … (2014), 96; MIRRIS Interim Report (2014); Schuch (2014); EU-13 – Net4Society (2014); Rauch and 
Sommer-Ulrich (2012). 
14 On BSR specific studies, see: Tõnurist and Kattel (2016), 9; Bengtsson (2009), 6-7; Gänzle (2017), 4; Kern and Gänzle (2013); 
Stead (2014), 333; Evaluation of Joint Programming … (2016), 24. 
15 Danish Agency for Science and Higher Education (2017). This overlaps rather well with prior studies on Joint Programming 
Initiatives and other cooperation measures of FPs, i.e. Svanfeldt (2009); Updated Policy Brief … (2016), 13-23; European 
Commission (2016a), 39; Evaluation of Joint Programming … (2016), 57; Makarow et al. (2014), 47. 
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7. Lack of institutional memory and political commitment to follow through with concrete 
initiatives and sufficient funding to enhance the levels of BSR research cooperation. 
8. Insufficient national research funding in general. 
9. Existing structures/programmes such as NordForsk and BONUS cover only part of the BSR or 
only selected research topics. 
 
In general, the previous studies largely concur with the challenges brought out by the BSN study. 
Though in our reading, the previous analyses have emphasised 4 main structural barriers inhibiting 
wider EU15-EU13 cooperation in RDI: 
 
First, insufficient R&D investments in the EU13 countries. Analyses of FP participation commissioned 
by the EC (Commission Analysis of September 2011) have concluded that participation is correlated 
with the national research investments and R&D personnel. The insufficiency of national funding is 
perceived as the key factor determining the capacity of research performers to design and pursue 
excellent research projects at the European level (Cressey 2017). In BSR countries (Figure 11), the 
total R&D investments have recently decreased in Estonia and Finland because of both public- and 
private-sector investment dynamics, which can even pose a threat to the sustainability of innovation 
systems (OECD 2017). Looking at the more recent successful countries in H2020 (e.g Portugal), it 
becomes even more evident that in times of economic crisis and instability, stable and contracyclically 
moving R&D investments help to avoid “institutional drift”, or even exhaustion, within the system 
(Pinto 2016). According to the recent data, only Estonia and Latvia (in contrast to, e.g., Finland) stand 
out as countries where declining national funding seems to not have impacted the success rate too 
significantly, but this has been strongly influenced by the impact of the specifically EU13-targeted 
“widening” measures (Teaming, ERA chairs; European University Association 2016, 39). 
 
 
Figure 11 Share of GERD as % from GDP 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT 
 
Second, the gap in variation of wages, even if corrected by the purchasing power, seems to be a major 
reason why the level of EU research funding from FP per country varies. In fact, it can account for up 
to 80% of the total variation in financial returns from FP (Commission Analysis of September 2011). 
The low salary level is a major reason for dissatisfaction (and source of brain drain) as well as low 
motivation to take up the role of coordinator in H2020. For instance, the MORE2 study found that 
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satisfaction with salary and benefits is low among all Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian researchers, 
irrespective of their career stage. Considering all other aspects of the work satisfaction, the 
differences to other EU countries were not pronounced. In fact, regarding the “opportunities for 
advancement” (highest among EU countries in Estonia) and “mobility perspectives” (highest among 
the EU countries in Latvia) these countries measure up quite well with other EU members (MORE2 
2013). However, it has also been found that in some BSR countries (Estonia, Latvia), mobility patterns 
are more balanced in terms of in- and outgoing researcher flows, but still more relevant movement 
from South to North is observable (Schumacher 2016). 
 
Third, lack of sustainable and functional synergies between national research systems and EU 
research foci. Rather surprisingly, EU13 participation has remained lower than that of EU15 even in 
FP areas with lower competition and sufficient financing, where weaker performers could find 
possibilities for disproportionally higher funding. In this context, it has been debated whether the 
predominantly soft ERA support mechanisms (mobility of researchers, transfer of scientific 
knowledge) will be enough without structural reforms of national R&D strategies and systems to 
bridge the gap between EU15 and EU13. 
 
Fourth, insufficient access to existing networks and limited experiences with project applications and 
management. It is argued that repeated participation and project coordination experience leads to 
higher participation rates and success. It has also been stated that “the lower share of EU‐13 is 
therefore caused not by a bias against the new EU Member States, but rather by a comparably high 
number of weak proposals submitted by, or with partners from the EU‐13.” In other words, EU13 
countries should put extra efforts into encouraging their research groups to apply for EU projects, 
even if in the first stage this will only have learning effects. For example, many universities in smaller 
countries and EU15 have tried to tackle the gap in participation between EU13 and EU15 by teaming 
up with more experienced universities in EU15 countries to build solid consortia; however, it is also 
recognised that entering already established consortia is a significant barrier (European University 
Association 2016, 24-25). 
 
The stakeholder interviews carried out in the framework of this study confirmed most of the 
arguments given in prior studies as well as the interpretations of our own analysis of participation 
dynamics in FPs. 
 
First, the researchers almost unanimously argued that for the EU13 researchers FP projects are 
needed predominantly for financial survival; however, it is also recognised that success in FP projects 
functions as a quality or excellence indicator for individual research groups (in applying for some 
national funds) and researchers (for career advancement). At the same time, the increasing 
competition of different instruments has meant that even in the case of very good or excellent 
projects, the final selection of projects has taken the form of a lottery. This may in the long term have 
a negative effect on the stakeholder motivations to keep applying for funds and to invest into 
relatively time-consuming attempts to coordinate such projects. As a result, the substantive 
importance and content of projects may become secondary, next to “gaming” the rules of different 
funds. Even now, many researchers from social sciences to ICT claim to know situations where already 
finalised project proposals are “traded” between different types of actors from different countries to 
increase the probabilities of success. It is fairly obvious that such gaming will be detrimental to 
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functional cooperation as well as substantive research progress. From the perspective of industry 
stakeholders, while SMEs seek both finances and some form of tangible results from international 
projects (to develop new or improved tools, methods, techniques), larger companies seem to 
emphasise the “technology-watch” function of ERA projects, i.e. participating in EU and regional 
cooperation projects to stay ahead of the latest S&T developments by establishing networks to gain 
access to knowledge and expertise; at the same time, faith in the feasibility of the direct 
commercialisation of results from such research projects seems to be limited (see also European 
University Association 2016; Astrom et al. 2012, 28-29; Performance of SMEs … 2014, 23, 65; Polt 
et al. 2009, 28-29; European Commission 2016c, 5-7). 
 
Second, regarding the logics of putting together transnational research consortia, researchers from 
most fields recognise that in H2020 applications, the geographical coherence or logic of projects 
does not matter for application success as much as the applicability and diffusion of research results. 
For EU13 research groups, this has created an additional challenge of finding appropriate industry-
/market-partners, and while SMEs and public-sector organisations can be found locally, collaboration 
with larger industry actors often takes place transnationally. While this may be beneficial for ERA-
wide knowledge and technology diffusion and networking, finding such partners internationally tends 
to be an additional barrier for the EU13 research groups and especially for new entrants to the 
transnational cooperation arena. 
 
Third, regarding BSR-based cooperation, it also seems clear the locational proximity itself is an 
insufficient driver for RDI cooperation, and BSR-level cooperation is highest in areas with strong 
functional proximity (e.g. maritime research focusing on the Baltic Sea), i.e. thematic overlaps and 
joint challenges are important drivers of cross-border RDI cooperation. In other areas, the 
representatives both from universities and the business sector do not see broader BSR partnerships 
within specific projects as a plausible strategy for increasing the success rate in FPs. 
 
In other words, BSR functions as a uniting platform for collaboration in two ways: 
 
1. The Baltic Sea as a thematic joint-interest area (e.g. next to marine sciences also other 
BSR-specific issues where functional proximity could be high, e.g. respondents proposed 
areas such as near-zero-energy buildings in specific climate conditions, cyber security, 
bioeconomy, etc.16). However, in the context of FPs, these topics need to be sufficiently 
critical or large enough for the EU to find its logical place. Some scholars argued that by 
now even the Baltic Sea is not an issue that sufficiently big and critical enough to merit 
specific focus in FP-funded projects. 
2. BSR as a “common service area” to engage different actors in common diffusion or 
application-oriented activities (e.g. joint-development digital textbooks by Finnish and 
Estonian researchers) or to treat BSR as a “test bed” for global market entry. This 
perspective would match the H2020 aim to test the projects on a large enough scale. 
 
Fourth, regarding the EU13-focused policy goal of “spreading excellence, widening participation” in 
ERA, most researchers seem to interpret these measures as political tools that partly contradict the 
                                               
16 See also other studies of the BSN that seek to define such common topics. 
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“normal” ways of transnational cooperation that are predominantly based on scientific excellence, 
international reputation and long-term network-building. Of course, researchers living under strong 
financial pressures and constraints are willing to accommodate their behaviour with such funding 
mechanisms, but they also recognise that this may not be a sustainable way forward if sufficient basic 
RDI capabilities are lacking both in academia and the market. This seems to be especially crucial for 
the EU13 countries that would often need stronger investment into infrastructure and basic research 
capabilities than soft mechanisms of network building, such as COST, Twinning etc. The same seems 
to apply to the EU’s PPP and P2P schemes and similar joint initiatives where top-up funding is needed. 
Thus, the effectiveness of these measures for EU13 seems to depend to a large extent on the strategic 
choices and commitments by policy makers: researchers are likely to follow, but not lead, such 
choices, as entrance to exiting networks requires significant policy-level commitment and financial 
commitments. Overall, while such soft instruments are necessary for networks building and 
sustaining ERA, these are not the primary needs of EU13 countries that would need to first invest into 
their own basic RDI capabilities and allow the RDI systems to mature. 
 
In sum: 
• The widening barriers overlap with general cooperation barriers. 
• Insufficient R&D investments in the EU13 countries, but also a lack of sustainable and 
functional synergies between national research systems and EU research foci seem to be the 
main barriers for widening research cooperation in BSR. 
• Research performers do not see broader BSR partnerships within specific projects as a 
plausible strategy for increasing the success rate in FPs. Rather, the basis for alliances could 
and should be in joint-interest areas or common-service areas in BSR. 
• Researchers do not perceive widening-instruments as a sustainable way forward if sufficient 
basic RDI capabilities are lacking both in academia and the market: moderate innovators 
should invest into R&D basic capabilities as a precondition for wider research collaboration in 
FPs. 
3. Policy Instruments to Increase Transational Cooperation in 
BSR and ERA 
This chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
• What new programmes are needed to encourage RDI partnerships in BSR? 
• What instruments could improve the participation capabilities of moderate innovators? 
• What kinds of instrument designs and managerial practices may be best suited? 
 
3.1. Stocktaking of recommendations for increasing transnational RDI 
cooperation in BSR and ERA 
One of the key preconditions for achieving active, systemic and wide participation in transnational 
RDI cooperation is about stable funding, as it lowers the dominance of “muddling through” and 
survival-oriented “maximisation” strategies by researchers and organisations, especially in austerity-
driven national innovation systems of the EU. It is necessary for the moderate innovators to embrace 
49 
 
the fact that the welfare of those countries in the longer term is contingent upon the investments 
into knowledge-based economy (including R&D investmets). 
 
Analysts have brought out several key lessons, which can be suggested to all countries to improve 
their participation in H2020 (Commission Analysis of September 2011): 
• participation should not be increased at any price, overly concentrating on the juste retour of 
finances should not be the goal; 
• all research areas cannot be addressed simultaneously, a selective and strategic approach to 
participation is seen superior; 
• a clear national strategic plan is needed, the countries cannot expect immediate results; 
• a robust NCP system is needed to support the applicants; 
• incentive systems for participants should be based on achievements; 
• appropriate alignment of EU and national objectives and synergetic use of ESIF is needed to 
build advantages. 
 
While the specific policy instruments for increasing transnational cooperation may differ in their 
rationales, intervention logics, institutional set-ups, scale and scope, we deploy an analytical 
framework that provides certain coherence for mapping and analyzing such practices. The most 
common approach for analyzing policy instruments is the typology proposed by Verdung:17 
1) regulatory instruments (the sticks): highest level of state intervention aimed at changing the 
behaviour of agents either via formulated rules and directives or via so-called “soft laws” such 
as different non-binding policy documents, strategies, action programmes, etc.; 
2) economic and financial instruments (the carrots): material incentives (e.g. subsidies, grants) 
to change the behaviour of agents in the systems; 
3) informative instruments (the sermons): aiming to change or prevent a certain type of 
behaviour via transfer of knowledge, communication of reasoned arguments and persuasion 
(e.g. research-funding to generate new knowledge, but also exchange of information and 
best practices, knowledge transfer, benchmarking). 
 
Based on Verdung’s typology, we provide a taxonomy (see Figure 12) for analyzing the instruments 
of transnational RDI cooperation. We divide potential cooperation activities between those with 
potentially high vs low functional proximity while also taking into account that some of these 
cooperation activities evolve in a bottom-up way and others tend to be driven or mandated by top-
down policy initiatives. In this section, we have supplemented the information derived from the expert 
interviews with the secondary information pooled from the websites of national agencies/ministries 
and other relevant reports (national roadmaps, previous studies by BSN (Danish Agency for Science 
and Higher Education 2017) etc.). We try to distinguish “best practices” that the EU13 countries could 
learn from EU15 countries as well as from each other in tackling the structural barriers for 
transnational RDI cooperation in BSR and ERA in general. 
 
 
                                               
17 Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2010), 9-16; for Verdung’s implications for innovation/regional policy, see also Borras and Edquist 
(2013); Uyarra et al. (2017), 604; also Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2002), 209; Colomb (2007). 
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Figure 12. Taxonomy of policy instruments for transnational cooperation in BSR 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
The sticks (regulatory and strategic instruments) 
First, it can be argued that greater integration of EU13 into ERA could benefit from better priority-
setting on the national level, especially in the areas where one can demonstrate unique capacities 
with sufficient critical mass in terms of infrastructure, data, and scientific specialisations etc. As the 
existing RDI networks of ERA may constitute considerable barriers to entry (Commission Analysis of 
September 2011), higher prioritisation is needed regarding the strategic aims for FP participation or 
internationalisation more broadly (especially in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Klincewicz 2015; 
Kulikovskis 2015; Ruttas-Küttim 2015; Paliokaitė 2015), along with developing action plans with 
specific aims and commitments to funding. The attempt to cover as wide a range of networks as 
possible without sufficient financial and policy-level commitment is not seen as a viable strategy by 
national experts and may lead to a negative image and perception of the EU13 countries in the 
transnational cooperation networks, as well (Danish Agency for Science Higher Education 2017). 
 
As a good example, Ireland has set specific strategic aims and operational targets per each pillar of 
H2020, which makes it possible to communicate national aims to researchers, but also to secure the 
necessary funding for supporting these activities, assess and give tailored advice to achieve the 
targets (Technopolis 2016). Also, innovator countries from BSR seem to emphasise a high level of 
prioritisation and scientific excellence as a prime underlying rationales, often going beyond BSR and 
ERA, both in terms of thematic and financial rationales.18 In fostering transnational cooperation, 
                                               
18  E.g. The web-page of the Innovation Fund Denmark, https://innovationsfonden.dk/en/investment/international-
collaborations; European Commission (2017a), 6; Finland as a Part … (2016); information retrieved from expert interviews. 
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strong emphasis is given here to the areas that are related to the long-term core national R&D 
competences, e.g. the Danish national programmes Grand Solutions, or Innobooster, and the 
provision of (big) national grants for “virtual research centres” to support the creation of critical mass 
in interdisciplinary research areas.19 As the latter programme was established before H2020 (together 
with a strong focus on horizontal issues), it has provided an additional basis to support the country’s 
competitiveness in H2020 afterwards. 20  Another noteworthy common practice of the innovator 
countries of BSR concern the support for participation in the EU initiatives via cross-sectoral 
collaboration projects, e.g. transnational cluster-to-cluster projects21, which in certain cases are 
eligible also to apply for H2020 preparatory grants.22 
 
The above-discussed approach assumes, first, the establishment of policy-making processes at the 
national level to legitimately agree upon national priorities and strategic agendas. In most innovator 
countries of BSR, this seems to be, firstly, achieved by embedding relevant stakeholders into the 
processes of strategic priority-setting at national levels (see Vinnova 2013). Secondly, this process 
needs to be complemented by appropriate financial and institutional mechanisms for 
creating/upgrading capacities in these priority areas. Thirdly, policy makers need to leverage these 
efforts with sufficient transnational policy coordination, e.g. focused participation (by national 
representatives with negotiation and decision-making authority) in relevant programme committees 
of H2020 and regional cooperation mechanisms. It was highlighted by our expert interviews that 
tighter cooperation during the development phase of different instruments (e.g. FP9) allows for better 
preparation for participation as well as timely notification about possible barriers. At the same time, 
the researchers interviewed from EU13 felt that their national representation in such activities is 
rather ad hoc and non-strategic. In general, however, it should be highlighted that BSR (innovator) 
countries – which perceive themselves as small countries in the EU – have only had a limited role in 
representing the region in the strategy formulations processes at the EU level so far. 
 
Secondly, the identification of the intersections of FP with other strategies is highly relevant for 
building up appropriate strategies for transnational cooperation. It is suggested that moderate-
innovator countries should try to map more sytematically the intersections of H2020, their 
national/regional smart-specialisation focuses (especially in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), ESIF, but also 
their BSR strategic aims. However, one has to acknowledge that the task of co-ordinating national 
and EU policies is a complex and multi-level challenge. It has been suggested that EC needs to 
                                               
19 The web-page of the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation, 
http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/international-cooperation; the web-page of the Danish Council for Independent 
Research, http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/councils-and-commissions/the-danish-council-for-independent-
research; the web-page of the Innovation Fund Denmark, https://innovationsfonden.dk/en/investment/international-
collaborations. See also the web-page of Vinnova, http://www2.vinnova.se/en/EU-and-international-co-operation/; the web-
page of Swedish Research Council, https://www.vr.se/inenglish.4.12fff4451215cbd83e4800015152.html; the web-page of 
TEKES, https://www.tekes.fi/en/funding/research_organisations/; the web-page of Academy of Finland, 
http://www.aka.fi/en/funding/our-funding-opportunities/. 
20 Information retrieved from expert interviews. 
21 Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, Strategy for research and innovation cooperation with the EU Horizon 2020 
and ERA. Available at https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/4c96155c697f47cabc2c4ea23e0507ec/strategy-for-
research-and-innovation-cooperation-with-the-eu-horizon-2020-and-era.pdf, 11-12; Danish Roadmap for the European 
Research Area 2016-2020. Available at http://ufm.dk/en/publications/2016/files/danish-roadmap-for-the-european-
research-area-docx.pdf, 37. 
22 The web-page of TEKES, https://www.tekes.fi/en/funding/research_organisations/. 
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harmonise FP/ESIF rules, but one also needs to take into account the climatic, economic etc. 
differences between countries (which would also mean strengthening the common BSR strategies in 
climate, security and similar areas in the EU instruments), but also avoid the establishment of 
mutually exclusive goals. Especially for the moderate-innovator countries, setting targets and 
reducing fragmentation is suggested. As the policy mixes, but also the regulatory environments of 
combining ESIF and FP funding, are still quite different (meaning also wider relational proximity for 
cooperation), the policy analysts have suggested more tailor-made instruments and solutions. For 
example, in the case of Estonia and Lithuania, the more recent shifts from “hard” measures to “soft” 
measures is perceived not to be enough, and accommodation of different regulations (e.g. state aid, 
cost models, sizes of grants, eglibility etc.) is needed. In moderate innovators, mostly the 
harmonisation (sometimes also simplification) of principles, rules and regulations for co-funding is 
suggested.23 The interviewed experts from Estonia brought out significant discrepancies between 
ESIF and FP rules (the former being even more complex to follow). This observation is also in line with 
the policy recommendations of the report by Kallas (2017, 28) that “the guiding principle should be 
that projects financed by ESIF should not receive more restrictive treatment than similar projects 
under central EU management” (European Union 2017). 
 
More generally, some actors we have interviewed were not aware of the shift towards innovation that 
has occurred in H2020 compared to FP7. Based on our analysis, but also according to other 
suggestions, it is necessary to promote and evaluate institutions based on the higher impact on 
society and innovation (mentioned especially in the cases of Estonia and Latvia), but also recognise 
more generally the wider role of universities in society. Also, at the level of universities, the societal 
engagement and innovation needs to be improved, which could lead to a greater readiness of 
moderate innovators for innovation-oriented H2020 and BSR instruments. We would additionally 
stress here that it is extremely important to aim at achieving better synergies rather than creating 
additional (separate) instruments in moderate-innovator countries. Otherwise these instruments will 
crowd out the international cooperation activities. 
 
As our analysis showed, the wider awareness about different instruments available for different actor 
types varies and is generally lower about newer instruments of H2020. Therefore, it is especially 
relevant on the BSR (in areas with common interest), national, but also institutional (university) levels 
to promote joint PCP & PPI funding opportunities. In some countries (e.g. Latvia), the policy reports 
bring out the need to adopt the legislation for enabling the participation of actors in these instrument 
types. Our analysis has showed that in moderate-innovator countries overall, there is hardly any 
participation experience, which makes us conclude that the problem of legislation alignment probably 
concerns a wider set of countries. The other problem concerns the mistmatch between the EU-level 
“lump sum” funding and local accountancy rules in moderate-innovator countries (e.g. Estonia), which 
already causes problems in COST scheme, but will presumably do so even more in the future. 
 
The sermons (informative and capability-building instruments) 
As there are many thematic focuses, which intersect different action types and a bulk of new 
instruments in H2020, clarifying the FP operations and giving timely information about instruments 
and application deadlines, conditions, etc. is extremely important for engaging a wider set of 
                                               
23 European Commission (2014). 
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researchers. One way would be to develop roadmaps connecting national support mechanisms and 
processes to FP and mechanisms for specific fields and institution types and to keep them updated 
in one place (here a good example could be the web page of Enterprise Estonia (Ruttas-Küttim 2015) 
bringing together different EU, national, regional instruments for the applicants from companies, 
universities and public sector in both the national language and English). In the BSR context, 
developing roadmaps connecting national support mechanisms and processes to FP processes and 
mechanisms in specific research fields would also be appropriate. At the intermediary levels, 
infomational materials/guides, developing guides for BSR cooperation opportunities (also in national 
languages) are appropriate. For the universities, developing guides matching institutional policies 
would be welcome to bring out the existing carrots for their researchers. 
 
We also suggest that the EC could publish, update and prognosticate the success rates across 
instruments (as done by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the US). It is necessary to publish 
and communicate to the member states the success rates of programmes/calls/action types, as they 
form the basis for decision-making of researchers, institutions and policy-makers. Therefore, it is 
also relevant to estimate success rates (as currently researchers cannot follow and operationally find 
this information and decide accordingly). To make the instruments of BSR more attractive, the 
respective funding bodies and national intermediaries need to communicate relatively higher success 
rates of BSR instruments to encourage the wider set of participants. Also, comparing and 
communicating success rates of national and international cooperation instruments would be 
relevant. 
 
At the level of moderate innovators, the key suggestions concern the improvement of information, 
communication, advice and training services (Commission Analysis of September 2011). As the 
instruments of transnational cooperation evolve towards greater complexity, the communication 
systems need to work well. Here, the EU sees NCPs as part of a key solution for supporting applicants. 
It is proposed that the EC should fund the NCPs to achieve uniform standards and service provision 
among the NCPs or to emulate the systems with strong NCP network such as in Austria (Ibid.). 
Regarding informative instruments at the national level, the innovation leaders of BSR have gone far 
beyond the mere establishment of national/regional structures for NCPs, as set out in the NCP 
Guiding Principles. 24  In most countries, there are policy instruments in place to facilitate the 
professionalisation of support services for international cooperation as well as mentor systems at 
different levels, e.g. development of in-house support systems in universities; an informal peer group 
of EUTI (especially for project coordinators) to share best practices; Eurocenter’s “train the trainer” 
program; the Innovation Fund Denmark assistance in finding H2020 partners all over the world; 
training sessions for ERC interviews by the Swedish Research Council; mutual exchange of experience 
and collaboration for better administrative support for H2020 by the associations of higher-
education institutions (e.g. NARMA), etc.25 
                                               
24 Minimum Standards and Guiding principles for setting up systems of National Contact Points (NCP systems) under Horizon 
2020, http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/support/20131125_NCP%20Minimum%20standards.pdf. 
25 The web-page of the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation, 
http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/international-cooperation; the web-page of the Innovation Fund Denmark, 
https://innovationsfonden.dk/en/investment/international-collaborations; The web-page of Swedish Research Council, 
https://www.vr.se/inenglish.4.12fff4451215cbd83e4800015152.html; Vinnova (2013); Norwegian Ministry of Education and 
Research, Strategy for research and innovation cooperation with the EU Horizon 2020 and ERA, 
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Thus, the NCP systems of the moderate countries may need to be shifted away from focusing mostly 
on providing consultancy to different single actors (including information days) towards a stronger 
emphasis to train, develop and equip in-house support units at universities that can work closer and 
more directly with research groups. The advancement of in-house capacities at universities is crucial 
for providing proper support for the management-related issues (from project proposals to running 
the projects). It has also been proposed that the third party involved in the preparation and 
management processes should be “a motivated party” (i.e. a performance-based model whereby 
successful submission of proposals is also essential for assessing in-house support structures). The 
greater assistance in the issues that can be transferred from one project to another (such as ethics, 
privacy, data management, open data, etc.) or building a mentor system, where senior (even retired) 
scholars could provide mentoring to junior scholars in entering the FP system, were also suggested. 
 
Previous BSN studies have also highlighed the demand for more systemic mapping of strengths and 
specialisations of BSR states to support finding the best potential partners in the region (Danish 
Agency for Science and Higher Education 2017). For moderate innovators, the improvement of the 
intregration of marginal (regional) actors by developing their capabilities would be very important to 
improve the bottom-up activity level in transnational cooperation. For individual countries, this 
implies empowering a wider range of actors besides universities and companies. Regional colleges, 
public agencies, professional HEIs, industry alliances etc. need to be both persuaded but also enabled 
to participate in transnational cooperation. 
 
For BSR, it would be important to map and empower regional (thematic) actors and different actor 
types to identify those with the most advanced resources and capabilities, but also to map their 
strategic aims and aspirations towards transnational collaboration. It has often been suggested to 
integrate national research communities, which require the creation of forums for exchanging 
experience (the interviewed experts saw this as an opportunity for the universities as well as 
companies and public-sector participants). It is important to bring together the actors with the most 
advanced resources and capabilities, but also to attract established researchers with extensive 
international networks. For increasing bottom-up participation in transnational cooperation, 
promoting awareness and participation culture more generally is suggested. This implies (thematic) 
information-sharing, partner-finding events, but also building mentoring systems based on 
successful applicants/other knowledgeable persons related to a specific technology or institution. 
 
The experience from FP7 and H2020 has shown that larger-sized projects can be problematic for 
small countries and new actors who are joining the projects (Commission Analysis of September 
2011). Similarly, coordinating the participation in advisory groups, but also 
coordinating/creating/empowering/timing joint representation of interests in EU institutions, 
advisory groups etc. related to the complexity of these “carrot”-based cooperation systems, poses 
additional complications for moderate-innovator countries with fragmented innovation systems and 
weak cooperation traditions and capabilities. Here we suggest the joint efforts of BSR (alternatively 
to the existing inter-institutional networks) based on the example of the Mediterranean Universities 
                                               
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/4c96155c697f47cabc2c4ea23e0507ec/strategy-for-research-and-innovation-
cooperation-with-the-eu-horizon-2020-and-era.pdf; information retrieved from expert interviews. 
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Union (UNIMED), which is a network of universities and research centres, active in promoting Euro-
Mediterranean academic cooperation, involving several thematic sub-networks, and which, in 2016, 
started to organise UNIMED weeks in Brussels to achieve wider discussion, but also visibility.26 
 
Finally, networking and mobility schemes in their different formats and aims (starting from the 
coverage of membership fees in international R&D organisations to inward/outward mobility of 
researchers, students and international experts/consultants) has gained equally strong attention in 
both innovator and moderate-innovator countries of BSR. Overall, there seem to be three common 
challenges for the future: 1) greater focus on results and impact of mobility (publishing as a natural 
element of mobility schemes); 2) developing systemic full-cost mobility schemes to encourage visits 
to leading international R&D centres (e.g. Mobility Plus Programme in Poland) 27  or to host 
international researchers/experts (e.g. FiDiPro Programme by TEKES)28; 3) standardisation or special 
agreement regarding salaries, taxation, pension issues for developing R&D capacities in moderate-
innovator countries while preventing brain drain (Danish Agency for Science and Higher Education 
2017). The question here is whether and on which terms common regional standards could be 
feasible (there are already examples where a special taxation scheme has been developed for 
international experts, especially in countries with high taxation rates).29 Among moderate innovators, 
Lithuania seems to stand out for a wide range of policy instruments for internationalisation and 
networking, e.g. instruments fostering the visibility of national research by supporting the publication 
and dissemination of the research in high-level scientific journals; funding of scientific events to 
facilitate international research relations; attracting international experts with special grants in 
specific research areas (e.g. interdisciplinary studies on facilitating modernisation processes of 
Lithuania).30 The latter is particularly relevant in the context where innovator countries of BSR remain 
more reluctant towards mere capacity-building initiatives for cooperation: “BSR research cooperation 
works best when it is driven by excellence (as opposed to by concerns related to capacity building), 
focusing on concrete solutions and specific impact, and is based on accessible networks” (Danish 
Agency for Science and Higher Education 2017, 27). 
 
The carrots (economic and financial instruments) 
Overall, while the EU13 countries face more issues and criticism regarding the quality of projects 
proposed etc., it seems that support measures and mechanisms to facilitate participation in the EU 
programmes have gained relatively higher and more systemic attention in innovator vs moderate-
innovator countries of BSR. In other words, many Nordic countries, but also Poland, have introduced 
policy instruments to transfer the preparatory risks of transnational cooperation projects from RDI 
performers to the national level. There are different ex-ante support measures introduced for 
drafting applications (covering payroll, external assistance, travel, meeting costs etc.) not only for 
H2020, but also for other EU programmes, such as BONUS, EUROSTAR. Some of the examples are 
listed below: 
                                               
26 The web-page of Mediterranean Universities Union, http://www.uni-med.net/en/about-us/. 
27  Institute of Fundamental Technological Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, http://www.kpk.gov.pl; the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education, http://www.nauka.gov.pl/en/;  
28 The web-page of TEKES, https://www.tekes.fi/en/funding/research_organisations. 
29 Information retrieved from expert interviews. 
30 Research Council of Lithuania, http://www.lmt.lt/en/about.html; Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology (MITA), 
http://www.mita.lt/en. 
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• SHOK programme and funding for large H2020 project preparation in Finland (H2020 project 
preparation (writing phase) presented as a normal TEKES project together with the 
requirements that the project should aim to broaden its future scope into international 
activities and have a significant impact on Finland and/or a Finnish partner having a 
substantial role in the project);31 
• EUopSTART in Denmark (grants funding preparatory activities in drawing up applications 
under H2020, etc. for Danish research institutions, enterprises and SMEs, whereas eligible 
costs cover payroll costs for staff; relevant travel expenses; expenses on hosting meetings, 
seminars; external assistance, etc.);32 
• PES2020 scheme in Norway (disbursed as a lump-sum based on the funding pledge awarded 
to the applicant; additional support for H2020 proposals getting over the threshold also 
possible);33 
• Granty na Granty (also for SMEs) in Poland (supports Polish R&D institutions to apply/improve 
their proposals for EU funding, limited to potential coordinators in the consortia. The 
organisations that received funding to prepare their proposal, but have not been assigned 
with a grant, can still apply for funding from this scheme in order to improve their proposal),34 
etc. 
 
The Baltic States seem to be more oriented towards ex-post support measures rewarding some level 
of partial success. For example, in Estonia, there is a support fund introduced for SME and ERC 
schemes for the proposals crossing the threshold but failing to receive funding from the EU, as well 
as “bonuses” for coordinating proposals that pass the quality threshold in H2020.35 More specifically, 
the preparation support for H2020 (including COST) and the Baltic BONUS projects in Estonia (in the 
size of €3600 for a consortium coordinator, €2400 for participation in an individual project, €1200 
for the WP manager and €1000 for Baltic BONUS; Ruttas-Küttim 2015) was unanimously positively 
highlighted by interviewees. All interviewed researchers suggested to give this kind of support to all 
projects evaluated above the threshold to cover the preparation costs. An additional opportunity on 
the country level is to use the funding model of “Seal of excellence”36, which is done in some BSR 
countries (Poland, Finland), but not in the Baltic countries. Securing baseline funding for relevant 
groups with future potential is recommended for Estonia and Latvia for different reasons. Both the 
high project-based funding level in Estonia and the generally low overall funding level in Latvia create 
overly high uncertainty for researchers. Similarly, on the institution level, securing top-up funding 
from baseline funding for researchers participanting in H2020 is recommended. Finally, the 
                                               
31 The web-page of TEKES, https://www.tekes.fi/en/funding/research_organisations/. 
32 Call for applications for EUopSTART (May 2017), http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/funding-programmes-for-
research-and-innovation/find-danish-funding-programmes/euopstart/euopstart-opslag-may-2017-uk.pdf. 
33  The web-page of Research Council of Norway, 
https://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Funding/PES2020/1254012082844?lang=en. 
34  Institute of Fundamental Technological Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, http://www.kpk.gov.pl; MIRRIS good 
practices, http://www.mirris.eu/Good%20Practies/Experiences_and_Tools_Grants%20_for_SMEs.pdf. 
35 The web-page of Estonian Research Council, http://www.etag.ee/en/. Here one can draw an additional parallel to the 
Swedish practice on SME instrument to “runner-up” companies, see the web-page of EASME, 
https://ec.europa.eu/easme/en/news/sweden-builds-sme-instrument-support-its-innovation-champions. 
36 This is an option where basically the projects evaluated with high scores of excellence, but left without funding, are 
additionally funded via special national calls. Opportunities for Seal of Excellence holders,  
http://ec.europa.eu/research/soe/index.cfm?pg=opportunities_msca. 
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incentives to promote participation at the institutional/individualal level in Estonia (e.g. the 
substitutability with ESIF) but also in Lithuania may need to be revised. For example, good incentives 
are in place in the Finnish R&D funding system, where the distribution of basic funding for an 
institution is topped up with 80% of the EU contribution over the course of three years (on one hand 
this will provide incentives to apply, but on the other hand also lower the risk and co-funding 
issues).37 
 
For enhanced international connectivity and networking, strengthening career-related standards 
(carrot) can be employed (mentioned, e.g., for Estonia), but also the wider use of peer review and 
international evaluation of competitive projects to familiarise applicants with the FP standards (in the 
case of Latvia). At the individual level, perhaps the strongest example of a “carrot” is in place in the 
Netherlands, where H2020 project coordination is related to the tenure track of professors. While 
speaking about incentive structures at the level of single researchers, however, one should remain 
cautious not to violate the balance between the workload vs bringing in more projects. For 
encouraging the “coordinator” role, it is suggested to create specific top-up funding for the 
coordination role (national), create/promote support functions (legal advise, finance etc.) for 
coordination (at the university level). It would also be important to create national co-funds and risk 
funds in moderate-innovator countries, as the low margin for error in audit-led evaluation 
discourages participation in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The lack of support for project 
management is also brought up as the main reason why coordination may not be desirable. 
 
Most of the suggestions reviewed in this chapter address relational proximity, while ignoring the 
relevance of functional proximity. Therefore, we propose the instruments for achieving greater 
functional proximity within BSR in chapter 3.3. 
 
In sum: 
• Policies at different levels should be developed towards a more systemic approach, including 
mapping and positioning the explicitly interconnected and/or additive aims of EU, 
transnational, regional and national policies. 
• Harmonised and simplified rules and regulations, including more flexibility within national 
legislations, would further reduce barriers and enhance cooperation possibilities between 
actors from different countries. 
• Timely and systemic support and communication of relevant information, tailored for different 
actors, is needed. 
 
                                               
37 Review of the Finnish funding system is in Estermann et al. (2013); focus group results. 
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For the European Commission: 
• As “sticks”, EC needs to allow for more bottom-up and innovative initiatives while supporting 
the harmonisation of the rules and conditions of research funding across member states. 
• Additional investments as “carrots” should serve to correct the low and varying success rates 
of different instruments and pay more attention to lagging thematic areas, which would 
reduce the “gaming” activities pursued currently by the applicants. 
• As “sermons”, the mix of policy instruments needs to be supported by better and more 
systematic information-sharing and communication strategies targeted to the individual 
agents (researchers, universities, enterprises). 
 
For the BSR: 
• As “sticks”, joint research interests need to be identified and defined in order to adequately 
represent the region also at the level of EU strategy formulation. 
• As “sermons”, common ground inside and common imago outside the BSR country group 
should be communicated through focus-area roadmaps containing timely and systematic 
information throughout the relevant (national, regional, supra-regional) instruments together 
with joint promotion and joint representation at the EU level. 
• Novel instruments for speeding-up bottom-up cooperation, such as BSN challenges, prizes; 
2nd best funding (ERC, H2020); virtual service centres and shared service centres can serve as 
“carrots” for this purpose. Better top-down steering of RDI cooperation could be based on 
novel instruments, such as a joint funding mechanism for funding BSR societal challenges; a 
joint BSR breakthrough accelerator; the development of common service areas (via IT-
solutions), which would support the imago of BSR as an innovative, but resilient region. 
 
For individual countries: 
• Priority setting as a key “stick”, together with making sure that national legislation, accounting 
and auditing practices, participation rules and regulations are harmonised to a degree that 
supports and widens research performers’ incentives to take on international projects. 
• As “carrots”, countries could shift the risks of participating in and especially coordinating 
international projects with a wider range of partners from research performers to the national 
level. 
• As “sermons”, countries could audit their support and communication systems and develop 
roadmaps connecting national support mechanisms and processes to FP across specific fields 
and institution types and to keep them easily accessible and updated. In addition, national 
NCP systems could be empowered to take on wider training and consultancy activities. 
 
Instead of a summary, the the above-proposed instruments are collected in the following three tables: 
• Instruments for increasing participation in moderate and strong-innovator countries 
• Instruments for improving the cooperation capabilities in moderate-innovator countries 
• Mechanism design and synergies with EU and regional instruments 
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Table 9 Instruments for widening participation in moderate- and strong-innovator countries 
Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
Improvement of the intregration of 
marginal (regional) actors 
(developing capabilities). 
Providing higher attention to 
increase the participation activity in 
the areas lagging behind and not 
belonging under the priority areas 
(traditional fields in particular, e.g. 
forestry in Estonia). 
Mapping and 
empowering regional 
(thematic) actors 
(actor types). 
Empowering a wider range of 
actors in National Inovation 
Systems for international 
cooperation (Regional 
Colleges, Public Agencies, 
Professional HEIs, Industry 
Alliances etc.). 
Embrace international 
RDI cooperation in 
institutional 
development strategies 
and build the 
respective capabilities, 
e.g. such as developed 
in Lithuania. 
Identification of actors with most 
advanced resources and capabilities 
and fostering synergies between 
them. 
Providing more room for bottom-up 
innovative initiatives. 
Mapping and 
empowering actors in 
common-interest 
areas (e.g. societal 
challenges in BSR 
and/or high-risk 
interdisciplinary 
fields, such as cyber 
security, big data, 
smart cities, 
bioeconomy). 
Mapping and bringing 
together important actors and 
their aims, e.g. a good 
example here virtual research 
centres in Denmark. 
Set aims of 
internationalisation to 
actors (e.g. to public 
firms, colleges). 
Awareness about different 
instruments available for different 
actor types. 
Publishing and communicating to 
MSs the success rates of 
programmes/calls/action types, as 
these are the basis for decision-
making. Prognosticating success 
rates. 
Promoting Joint PCP & 
PPI in areas with 
common interest. 
Communicating the 
success rates of BSR 
instruments. 
Promoting PCP & PPI (if 
needed, adopting the 
legislation: Latvia). 
Comparing and 
communicating national and 
international success rates 
(Estonia, Lithuania). 
Promote PCP & PPI. 
Awareness about shift towards 
innovation in H2020 compared to 
FP7. 
  Promoting and evaluating 
institutions based on higher 
impact on society and 
innovation (Estonia, Latvia). 
Promote societal 
engagement & 
innovation. 
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Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
Selective encouragement of the 
participation activity, appropriate 
alignment of EU and national 
objectives. 
Revising the current funding system 
for R&D projects, where the 
increasing numbers of high-level 
applications/projects remain out of 
funding (too much openness 
contributing to the higher intensity 
of competition as a considerable 
side effect vs setting higher entry 
barriers, e.g. in FET). 
Providing higher 
attention to strategic 
cooperation during 
the development 
phase of different 
instruments (e.g. 
FP9). 
Developing strategic aims 
together with higher 
prioritisation and 
commitments to funding 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
Developing action 
plans with specific 
aims. 
Reviewing the incentives for 
institutions/individuals to promote 
participation. 
Increasing the funding to match 
increased competition (to achieve 
success rates between 15 and 
20%38). 
Introducing BSR 2nd 
best funding. 
Review incentives: Estonia 
(substitutability with ESIF), 
Lithuania. Developing further 
preparation support measures 
for H2020, while widening the 
scope of the existing ones and 
establishing new ones to 
mitigate the related risks ex 
ante (incl. support to develop 
the early stages of prototypes 
(H2020 oriented & on wider 
testing and dissemination). 
Providing incentives for 
support structures to 
increase their 
motivation in relation 
to application and 
project-management 
processes. Providing 
career-related 
incentives at the 
individual level. 
Clarifying the FP operation, timely 
information about instruments and 
application deadlines, conditions 
etc. 
Revising the horizontal nature of 
calls and the variety and lack of 
synergy between ERA instruments 
and initiatives. 
Coordinating the 
participation in 
advisory groups in 
common interest 
areas. 
Developing roadmaps 
connecting national support 
mechanisms and processes to 
FP processes and mechanisms 
for specific fields/institution 
types, keeping them updated 
in one place (Estonia). 
Developing roadmaps 
connecting national 
support mechanisms 
and processes to FP 
processes and 
mechanisms in specific 
research fields. 
Coordinating support services to 
promote participation. 
Supporting further development of a 
more cohesive NCP system. 
Developing common 
platforms to share 
information, 
experience and 
Facilitating the 
professionalisation of support 
services for international 
cooperation at the national 
Facilitating the 
professionalisation of 
support structures for 
international 
                                               
38 European Commission (2017b). 
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Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
facilitate cooperation 
between 
organisations for 
support services (NCP, 
university 
associations) in BSR. 
level together with 
strengthening the NCP 
networks, good examples 
here, e.g., EUTI in Finland, 
Eurocenter in Denmark. 
cooperation as well as 
mentor systems for 
project 
applicants/managers. 
Coordinating/creating/empowering 
joint representation offices in 
Brussels. 
 Creating joint 
representation offices 
and activities 
(Mediterratean 
example). 
Creating joint representation 
offices (Mediterratean 
example). 
Creating joint 
representation offices 
(Mediterratean 
example). 
Infomational materials/guides. Better equipment of calls with a 
more comprehensive range and 
precise key words. 
Developing guides for 
BSR cooperation 
opportunities. 
Developing guides in national 
language. 
Developing guides 
matching institutional 
policies. 
Encouraging the “coordinator” role.  Promoting BSR as role 
model in 
advancements of 
specific (niche) 
research areas. 
Creating specific top-up for 
the coordination role. 
Creating/promoting 
support functions 
(legal advise, finance 
etc.) for coordination. 
Creation of co-fund and risk-fund. Leveraging private-sector 
investment as much as possible 
(together with MSs instruments like 
tax credits and innovative public 
procurement). Creating co-funding 
mechanisms with industry, 
countries, foundations and other 
sources of funding. 
 Creating co-fund and risk-
fund (low margin for error in 
audit-led evaluation 
discourages participation) 
(Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania). 
Alternatively creating top-up 
national funding to H2020 
(Finnish example). 
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Table 10 Instruments for improving the cooperation capabilities in moderate-innovator countries 
Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
Integrating national research 
communities. 
 Creating forums for exchanging 
experience. 
Creating forums of exchanging 
experience. 
Creating forums 
of exchanging 
experience. 
Bringing together the actors 
with the most advanced 
resources and capabilities. 
Creating equal salary 
conditions for EU13 as 
this would help to hire 
top-level researchers 
and motivate 
transnational 
cooperation. 
Considering standardisation or 
developing special agreements regarding 
salaries, taxation, pension issues, etc. in 
the region to support networking vs brain 
drain39. 
Developing full-cost mobility 
schemes to facilitate inward and 
outward mobility of high-level 
(inter)national experts. 
Attracting 
established 
reseachers with 
extensive 
networks. 
Promoting awareness & 
participation culture. 
 Conducting information-sharing events, 
(thematic) partner-finding events. 
Conducting information-sharing 
events. Conducting partner-
finding events. 
Conducting 
information-
sharing events. 
Conducting 
partner-finding 
events 
Building mentoring systems 
based on successful 
applicants/other 
knowledgeable persons. 
 Creating specific technology-mentor 
groups. 
Creating national mentor groups. Creating 
institutional 
mentor groups. 
International connectivity & 
networking. 
 Providing up-to-date thematical 
information about the state of existing 
expertise in knowledge and capacities 
(including infrastructure) as well as 
mapping different value chains and smart 
specialisations in BSR. 
Creating personal networks 
internationally (Estonia). 
Establishing measures to foster 
the visibility of national research 
at the international level and/or to 
facilitate international research 
relations, a good example here: 
Lithuania. 
 
Use of peer review and   Introducing peer review and  
                                               
39 Danish Agency for Science and Higher Education (2017). 
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Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
international evaluation of 
competitive projects to 
familiarise applicants with 
the FP standards. 
international evaluation practices 
of projects (Latvia). 
 
Table 11 Mechanism for designing synergy between EU and regional instruments 
Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
Co-ordinating 
national and EU 
policies. 
Harmonising FP/ESIF rules.  
Considering climatic, economic 
and physical differences 
between countries. 
Avoiding setting mutually 
exclusive goals. 
Reviewing strategies & creating 
aims/targets to FP participation. 
Reviewing strategies & 
creating aims/targets to FP 
participation, reducing 
fragmentation (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania). 
Reviewing strategies & 
creating aims/targets to 
FP participation. 
More tailor-made 
solutions. 
 Developing tailor-made solutions for 
mutual complementarities/filling in the 
gaps in national innovation systems 
within BSR partners. 
Developing tailor-made 
solutions (Estonia, Lithuania), 
shift from “hard” to “soft” 
measures is not enough. 
 
Supporting networks 
for coordinating and 
promoting 
participation. 
Paying specific attention to the 
consortia if the coordinator is 
not the best in the field to 
remedy systemic barrier for 
moderate innovators. 
Developing joint network capacities. Developing and supporting 
network capacities (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania). 
Developing and 
supporting network 
capacities. 
Developing strategic 
partnerships for 
participation. 
Reviewing the 
capabilities of 
different actors for 
participation. 
 Reviewing the (thematic) strong actors 
and topics/fields. 
Paying attention to the mutual 
complementarities. 
Reviewing and expanding the 
bulk of actors (private, public 
sector, professional higher 
education). 
Considering and expanding 
support funds. 
Reviewing and 
supporting the 
capabilities. 
 
Considering and 
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Policy Challenge Policy instruments on different levels 
EC Macro-regional National Institutional 
expanding support 
funds and incentives. 
Identification of the 
intersections of FP 
with other strategies. 
Communicating better that the 
hierarchy of different measures 
is needed to understand the 
logic of sequence and synergy 
between them. 
Mapping the intersections with smart 
specialisation. 
Mapping the intersection with 
smart specialisation, ESIF 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
 
Aligning principles, 
rules and regulations 
of public support & 
co-funding. 
Promoting co-funding with 
ESIF, align FP and ESIF rules. 
Considering the harmonisation of 
principles, rules and regulations for BSR 
co-funding40. 
Alignment and harmonisation 
(sometimes simplification) of 
principles, rules and 
regulations for ESIF and FP co-
funding41 (Estonia, Latvia). 
Developing internal 
processes to 
acommodate different 
funding principles, rules 
and regulations. 
Securing stable 
baseline funding for 
relevant groups. 
 Considering novel instruments for 
second-best applications. 
Securing baseline funding for 
those with future potential 
(Estonia, Latvia). 
Securing top-up from 
baseline funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
40 European Commission (2014). 
41 European Commission (2014). 
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3.2. Novel policy instruments and measures to improve RDI cooperation 
in BSR and ERA 
When we think about transnational RDI cooperation in regions, such as BSR or ERA in general, we 
should distinguish between two types of transnational RDI cooperation policies (see here also Figure 
13, relying upon Verdung’s typology discussed above): 
 
1) Policies that can speed up bottom-up transnational cooperation initiatives. Such initiatives 
emerge in areas with strong functional proximity and from the bottom-up initiatives and 
networks of RDI performers. As these kinds of activities tend to be independent from political 
push-and-steer mechanisms, the soft measures rather than strong interventions may be more 
suitable and sufficient. 
 
2) Policies that try to initiate and steer new types and forms of transnational RDI cooperation 
either in new domains (of research, societal challenges) and/or between new partners (from 
different regions, economies etc.). These policies often depart from territorial and/or 
relational proximity and try to increase functional proximity through policy interventions. 
 
In both cases, the intra-regional differences (i.e. between EU13 and EU15 in BSR) may necessitate 
additional policy efforts that support the development of complementary RDI capabilities and 
specialisations, but these should be treated and analysed as preconditions for transnational RDI 
cooperation. 
 
The “speeding-up” policies could provide additional leverage to tackle common BSN challenges, 
especially as BSR has already established several incentives/funding schemes for fostering 
transnational research and innovation in the region and cooperation in the specific areas of scientific 
excellence, but also supporting further utilisation of R&I infrastructure and mobility. As specific 
incentive mechanisms, we can propose the following instruments and initiatives: 
• Virtual service centres to provide up-to-date thematical information about the state of 
existing expertise in knowledge and capacities (including infrastructure) as well as mapping 
of different value chains and smart specialisations in BSR that could extend the support for 
bottom-up cooperation from research towards testing and diffusions. 
• Shared service centres (with cross-border rotation of staff) could be developed for capacity-
building of NCPs, university associations, etc., to provide them with tools how to equip in-
house support structures of different actors on the nation-state levels, but also to facilitate 
cooperation between the respective institutions in BSR. In essence, one of the previously 
covered best-practice measures, “train the trainer”, is suggested to be implemented in the 
transnational context (i.e. to bring together the key competences in BSR to train, develop and 
equip those more moderate and/or share knowledge about the latest trends, best practices, 
etc. together with an orientation on intermediary actors). 
• BSR 2nd best funding facility for the project proposals that receive very good evaluations and 
are evaluated as highly relevant for the region, but fail to receive the funding from two-phase 
programmes of H2020 (e.g. ERC, SME, Teaming). The criteria, the selection committee, etc. 
as well as the institutional set-up could be worked out at the level of BSN. 
66 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Novel policy instruments for transnational cooperation in BSR 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
In the case of top-down policies aimed at wider BSR challenges, where the mere reliance on bottom-
up initiatives for cooperation may be insufficient, the following mechanism could be considered: 
• BSR societal-challenges initiatives (e.g. in environment, energy, health): either joint thematic 
grants or regionally (BSR level) designed and coordinated but nationally and sub-regionally 
implemented policy initiatives and projects, i.e. providing and managing different but 
complementary (as agreed and coordinated) RDI focuses and types of funded activities in 
different countries or regions of BSR (think of how Airbus planes are built and assembled); 
• BSR breakthrough accelerator: RDI grants for cooperative exploratory and/or high-risk and 
high-return projects in new upcoming interdisciplinary fields, such as cyber security, big data, 
smart cities, bioeconomy, etc., where cooperation at the level of BSR would be essential to 
create critical mass to compete globally (could be again jointly organised grants with common 
pot or topic-level coordination of different national policy initiatives and instruments); 
• BSR as a “common service area” to engage different actors in common diffusion or 
application-oriented activities (e.g. grants for feasibility studies to map the potential needs 
 
67 
 
as well for the development of ICT tools/applications that are oriented on the provision of 
certain (public) services across different countries in the region). 
 
The developments in the aforementioned areas would potentially promote BSR as role model in 
advancements of specific (niche) research areas, building the specific institutional capacities and 
scientific excellence. 
 
In sum:  
• Relying on Verdung’s typology of policy instruments, we have suggested two types of 
transnational RDI cooperation policies to “nudge” the incentives of RDI performers for 
improved RDI cooperation in BSR and ERA in general. 
• First, policies that can speed up bottom-up transnational cooperation initiatives in areas with 
strong functional proximity and that could provide an additional leverage to tackle common 
BSN challenges, especially as BSN has already established several incentives/funding schemes 
for fostering transnational RDI in BSR. 
• Second, policies that try to initiate and steer new types and forms of transnational RDI 
cooperation, either in new domains (of research, societal challenges) and/or between new 
partners (from different regions, economies etc.). The respective interventions concern BSR 
societal challenges, where the mere reliance on bottom-up initiations for cooperation may be 
insufficient (e.g. in environment, energy, health), but also fostering exploratory and/or high-
risk and high-return RDI projects in new upcoming interdisciplinary fields (such as cyber 
security, big data, smart cities, bioeconomy). 
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Appendix 1 Overview of the main instruments and their logic to support cooperation in ERA and BSR 
Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
Global level Not explored in this study    
Supra-national 
level 
The EU, incl. the  
ERA 
FP7 and H2020 Supranational state model The biggest EU Research and 
Innovation programmes 
Directly funded from the EU budget 
  PPP Partnerships: 
JTI42 
Vertical convergence → 
large-scale multinational 
collaboration, most of the 
EU funding for PPP go to 
JTIs 
High integration of national 
research programmes to 
address progress in the 
selected key areas essential to 
European competitiveness and 
societal challenges 
Implementation through dedicated 
legal entities – Joint Undertakings – 
that organise their own research 
agenda and award funding for 
projects on the basis of open calls 
  P2P Partnerships: 
JPI43 
Coordination, whereas MSs 
develop and implement 
joint Strategic Research 
Areas (SRAs), whereas the 
EU acts as a facilitator. 
Duration not determined 
Coordination and integration 
of national research 
programmes to address 
societal challenges in the 
selected areas 
Variable geometry basis, requires 
high political endorsement. 
National funds as the main source, 
top-up of the EU funding possible 
but not guaranteed; PS! Member 
State can rely upon the EU 
Structural Funds in their financial 
contributions 
P2P Partnerships: Art. 
185 BONUS and 
BONUS+44  
Vertical convergence and 
coordination → article 185 
initiatives represent the 
closest and long-term 
(duration 10 years, 
typically) integration of 
Integration of national research 
programmes, together with a 
strong thematic focus (incl. 
jointly agreed Strategic 
Research Agenda for the Baltic) 
Close to a “real” common pot; 
beneficiaries have agreements and 
receive payments from both BONUS 
EEIG and national funding agencies 
(dual money flow). 
                                               
42 The EU official web-page of Horizon 2020: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/area/partnerships-industry-and-member-states; the web-page of ERA-LEARN 
2020: https://www.era-learn.eu/public-to-public-partnerships/other-instruments-and-other-initiatives/joint-technology-initiatives-jti. 
43 The Issue Papers for the High-level Group on Maximising the Impact of EU Research and Innovation Programmes (2017), 9; the web-page of ERA-LEARN 2020: https://www.era-
learn.eu/public-to-public-partnerships/joint-programming-initatives; Burbridge et al. (2014). 
44 Burbridge et al. (2014); The Issue Papers for the High-level Group on Maximising the Impact of EU Research and Innovation Programmes (2017), 9; European Commission. (2016a), 
22. 
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Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
national and EU 
programmes 
Cash or in-kind contributions; 
multiannual financial commitments 
to which the EU contributes with 
matching funds. 
Management by a dedicated 
implementation structure (EEIG), 
whereas implemented by National 
Funding Agencies within BSR.  
P2P Partnerships: 
Era-Nets45 
Coordination (multi-
directional), whereas 
financial integration has 
increased, implementation 
structure lacks continuous 
support. Duration no longer 
than 5 years 
Mutual learning and building of 
partnerships → coordination of 
national research programmes 
together with a strong 
thematic focus 
Variable geometry and a virtual 
common pot; Member States launch 
and implement a joint call with top-
up EU funding (not more than 33%); 
Member State can cover the costs 
from the ERDF. 
Programmatic cooperation between 
national research funding bodies, 
who act as financial contributors 
and programme owners. 
Widening 
Participation, e.g. 
ERA-Chairs, 
Twinning, Teaming46 
Cooperation/coordination 
(strongly unidirectional); 
Duration max 5 years 
Emulation and lesson-drawing 
→ orientation on lower-
performing Member States, 
esp. research capacity and 
institutional networks, together 
with staff exchanges, expert 
advice and assistance 
Implemented under CSA Actions 
(Twinning: Horizon 2020 funds 
100% of the eligible costs); in other 
cases, commitments from the 
interested national or regional 
authorities to provide the necessary 
financial resources required. 
Member State can cover the costs 
from the ERDF 
                                               
45 Lepori et al. (2011); Burbridge, P. R. et al. 2014; The Issue Papers for the High-level Group on Maximising the Impact of EU Research and Innovation Programmes (2017), 29; 
European Commission. (2016d), 24; the web-page of Estonian Research Council: http://www.etag.ee/en/funding/partnership-funding/; https://www.era-learn.eu/public-to-
public-partnerships/test. 
46 The EU official web-page of Horizon 2020: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/spreading-excellence-and-widening-participation; the web-page 
of Estonian Research Council: http://www.etag.ee/en/funding/partnership-funding/; European Commission (2014). 
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Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
    
      
Supra-regional 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The macro-
regional 
cooperation in 
the EU47 
The EU Strategy for 
the BSR – EUSBSR. 
25 EUSBSR flagship 
projects implemented 
via INTERREG48; 
BONUS has 
contributed to 
EUSBSR via a flagship 
project BSR Stars 
A two-tier construction of 
coordination/multi-level 
governance: a) the role of 
the Commission as a 
“watchdog” in monitoring 
implementation; and b) the 
Member States/key 
organisations (incl. 
HELCOM, VASAB) 
responsible for the 
implementation and 
management of various 
priority areas 
Trans-national problem-
solving in the BSR area, 
together with a strong 
thematic orientation: 
1) maritime issues; 
2) Baltic Sea as an EU internal-
sea; 
3) a test-bed for territorial 
rescaling in the EU 
Does not have a self-funding 
scheme, funded by the European 
(incl. ERDF), national and regional 
budgets and programmes. 
 INTERREG, incl. 
Transnational 
Programme for the 
BSR49 
Some level of vertical 
convergence due to reliance 
on the EU Structural Funds. 
This instrument also has 
strong synergy with the 
EUSBSR, especially in the 
current programming 
period. 
Strong focus on the Baltic Sea 
as a territorial platform for 
transnational cooperation. In 
INTERREG, maritime and 
environmental issues, crucial 
esp. in later programmes. 
The priorities, funding 
conditions and territorial 
coverage (the geographical 
scope has been widening) have 
been changing under each of 
the INTERREG programme 
since the 1990s. 
Primarily ESIF (ERDF), also the 
European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) and Instrument for 
Pre-Accession (IPA). 
The programme co-funds up to 85% 
for partners from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland. 
Managed by the coordinating 
bodies at the programmes level. 
                                               
47 European Commission (2013). 
48  The web-page of INTERREG Baltic Sea Region: https://www.interreg-baltic.eu/about-the-programme/eusbsr/contributions-2014-2020.html; the web-page of BONUS: 
https://www.bonusportal.org/programme/funding_development; Bengtsson (2009), 2, 6-7; Lindholm (2011); Gänzle (2017); Kern and Gänzle (2013), 10-11. 
49 Stead (2014), 328-330. 
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Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
EC Smart 
Specialisation S3 
Baltic Sea Region, 
including the project 
Stairway to 
Excellence (S2E) 
aimed at EU13 
(complementarities 
between ESIF, H2020 
and other EU funding 
programmes)50 
Vertical convergence 
(harmonisation → RIS3 as 
an ex-ante conditionality 
for the EU Cohesion Policy 
in the 2014-2020 
programming period) 
This instrument has strong 
synergy with the EUSBSR, 
especially in the current 
programming period. 
Sector, cluster-based 
orientation; place-based 
economic transformation 
Primarily, ESIF 
Variable geometry, albeit on a 
subnational level. Managed by 
national funding agencies. 
Meta-regional 
level 
 STRING51 Collaboration 
(multidirectional) between 
sub-national actors 
Cross-border cooperation for 
joint politics at the meta-
regional level; the geography 
of partners crucial → making it 
also potentially attractive as an 
eligible region to benefit from 
EU funds 
Has a coordinating body – STRING 
Secretariat; the funding sources 
come from the EU and INTERREG 
                                               
50 The European Commission’s web-page on smart specialisation platform: http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/s3-in-baltic-sea-region; Sörvik et al. (2016); Tõnurist and Kattel 
(2016), 4. 
51 The web-page of STRING: http://www.stringnetwork.org/string-partners/string-partners/#.WSQWlKISB-1. 
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Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
Regional level 
 
Inter-
governmental 
cooperation and 
transnational 
policy-making 
networks 
The Council of the 
Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) & the Nordic 
Council of Ministries 
(NCM) (incl. 
NordForsk)52 
Collaboration/coordination 
(multidirectional); 
horizontal/vertical 
convergence. 
Governmental actors from 
the national and sub-
national level 
The main distinction between 
NCM and CBSS is the former’s 
strong reliance on different 
agencies in the field of 
research and innovation 
NordForsk: variable geometry 
principle/common pot (managed by 
a supranational agency), together 
with top-up funding from 
NordForsk (1/3) and participating 
countries (2/3). 
Participation is voluntary, whereas 
at least 3 countries must 
participate. 
CBSS acts as a policy forum without 
a general budget or project fund. 
Has a coordinating structure. Its 
projects, such as Baltic Science 
Network and Baltic TRAM, 
implemented under the umbrella of 
EUSBSR and via INTERREG Baltic Sea 
Region, see above. 
Inter-
organisational 
cooperation and 
networks in the 
region, incl. bi- 
and multilateral 
collaboration 
programmes 
The Baltic Sea Region 
University Network 
(BSRUN); NOVA 
University Network, 
BOVA University 
Network; Baltic 
University 
Programme (BUP)53 
Collaboration and 
horizontal convergence 
(multidirectional), national 
universities as the dominant 
actors 
Thematic cooperation in 
education and research-related 
activities, incl. mobility 
Participation costs from member 
higher-education organisations; 
managed by a coordinating 
structure. 
In case of BUP, funding provided 
also e.g. by the Swedish 
Government, SIDA, Uppsala 
University, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, next to membership fees. 
                                               
52 The web-page of NORDFORSK: http://www.nordforsk.org/en; the web-page of CBSS: http://www.cbss.org/council/; Sepposen et al. (2015); Technopolis (2011), 8. 
53  The web-pages of the respective university networks: http://bsrun.org/; http://www.bova-university.org/; https://www.nmbu.no/en/students/nova; 
http://www.balticuniv.uu.se/index.php/about-us. 
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Level of 
coordination 
Main 
instruments 
Key examples The mode of governance 
and level of integration 
The main rationale for 
cooperation 
Funding mechanisms 
 E.g. EEA and 
Norwegian-Estonian 
Research 
Cooperation54 
Collaboration and 
horizontal convergence 
(unidirectional), national 
states as the dominant 
actors 
Strong focus on emulation → 
the limited circle of beneficiary 
countries (Central-Eastern 
European (CEE) and Baltic 
countries) 
Ad-hoc collaboration between 
national funding agencies; 
implemented jointly by the EEA 
Financial Mechanism and Norwegian 
Financial Mechanism; the share of 
top-up funding by participating 
organisations rather small. 
 E.g. bilateral Estonia-
Latvia cross-border 
cooperation55 
 
Collaboration 
(multidirectional)/coordinati
on (some level of vertical 
convergence) → cooperation 
programmes under the EU 
territorial cooperation goal 
Cooperation between 
neighbouring countries to feed 
into the cohesive growth and 
development in the EU 
Financed from INTERREG; some part 
of the implementation and 
monitoring transferred to a 
supranational level – Joint 
Secretariat; management and 
implementation at the national 
government level. 
                                               
54 The web-page of EEA and Norway grants: http://eeagrants.org/Where-we-work/Estonia; http://www.etag.ee/en/funding/partnership-funding/eeanorway-grants/. 
55 The web-page of INTERREG Estonia-Latvia: https://estlat.eu/. 
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Appendix 2: Methodology for Segregation Indexes 
We employ here the indexes of segregation, which are commonly used quantitative measures 
describing social separation. “People get separated along many lines and in many ways. There 
is segregation by sex, age, language, religion, colour, taste, comparative advantage and the 
accidents of historical location. Some segregation results from the practices of organisations; 
some is deliberately organised; and some results from the interplay of individual choices that 
discriminate. Some of it results from specialised communication systems, like different 
languages” (Schelling 1971, 143). 
 
The total number of participations is T, and M represents the participations from the EU13 
country group (0 < M < T). The overall fraction of EU13 country participations is P=M/T. In 
case there are n projects, the pi = mi/ti is the fraction of EU13 participants in the particular 
project i. We calculate first the index of dissimilarity (D) (originating from Duncan and Duncan 
1955, but in this version adopted from Baroni and Ruggieri (2015): 
𝐷 =
1
2∙𝑃∙(1−𝑃)
∑𝑖=1𝑛
𝑡𝑖
𝑇
∙ |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑃|,      (1) 
where 2P(1-P) is a normalisation factor to place the index in the range between 0 and 1. The 
dissimilarity index would be at its minimum when the distribution of participants from EU13 
countries is uniform over the projects. (The similar measures of the Theil and Gini indexes 
could be calculated here, too; Duncan and Duncan 1955). 
 
Secondly, we calculate the isolation index, which is defined as the likelihood of a participant 
from EU13 countries being exposed to another member of the same country group in a 
project. For the particular project i, this is estimated as the product of the likelihood that a 
member of the EU13 countries is in the project (mi/M) divided by the likelihood that she is 
exposed to another EU13 participant in the unit (mi/ti, or pi), assuming that the two events 
are independent: 
𝐼 =
1
𝑀
∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1          (2) 
The isolation index runs over the range from P (overall fraction of minority group participation) 
to 1, whereby higher values denote higher segregation. Again, the minimum value is reached 
where pi = P; the maximum value is reached where there is only k, such that mk=tk =M, which 
means the unit contains all EU15 members and no EU13 member. 
 
A complementary measure is the interaction (or exposure) index, which is the likelihood that 
a member of the minority group is exposed to a member of the majority group in a unit, which 
is the following: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 =
1
𝑀
∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1         (3) 
The index of interaction measures how the majority group dominates (or shares, if the index 
value is lower) the project participations; it runs from P-1 to 0, where higher values show 
higher domination. It is clear from (2) and (3) that I + Int = 1. As the totals of T and M cannot 
be so easily detected from the data, but also participants can join several projects, we use 
here 𝑇 = ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and 𝑀 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , thus the size of the total population of participations is by 
definition the sum of the sizes of the unit (project) populations, and similarly for the minority 
group (Baroni and Ruggieri 2015). 
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Appendix 3: Statistical Data 
 
Figure 14 Share of funding from abroad in total R&D expenditure by country groups 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT. 
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Figure 15 Share of funding from abroad in total R&D expenditure by country 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT. 
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Figure 16 Total R&D expenditure funded abroad and Horizon2020 contribution in EU15 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda and Horizon mid-evaluation (as of 1 January 2017, 66) 
Note: Latest year is 2015 unless indicated with *2014 and **2013. 
 
Figure 17 Total R&D expenditure funded abroad and Horizon2020 contribution in EU13 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda and Horizon mid-evaluation (as of 1 January 2017, 66) 
Note: Latest year is 2015 unless indicated with *2014 and **2013. 
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Table 12 Explaining Action Types in H2020 
Type of Action Code Number of Applicants Types of Applicants EU Funding 
Rate 
Description 
ERA-Net Cofund56. ERA-NET-
Cofund 
Min 2 legal entities from different 
MS/AC 
Research Funders 33% Instrument for supporting public-public 
cooperation in joint calls and joint activities 
across all H2020 priority areas with national 
funding and H2020 top-up funding 
Pre-Commercial 
Procurement 
PCP Min 3 independent legal entities 
from different MS/AC 
Public procurers 70% 
 
Pre-Commercial 
Procurement Cofund 
Action57 
PCP 
COFUND 
Min 2 independent legal entities 
(public procurers) from two 
different MS/AC 
Public procurers 70% Instrument for procuring innovative goods 
and services, group of public buyers with 
one lead procurer, joint call for tender, joint 
evaluation of offers, awarding in the name 
of the group 
Public Procurement of 
Innovative Solutions 
PPI Min 3 independent legal entities 
from different MS/AC 
Public procurers 20%   
Public Procurement of 
Innovative Solutions 
(PPI) Cofund actions58  
COFUND-
PPI 
Min 2 independent legal entities 
(public procurers) from two 
different MS/AC 
Public procurers 20% Instrument for procuring innovative 
solutions – joint tender, joint evaluation but 
awarding can be individual (as well as 
through lead procurer) 
                                               
56 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-annex-d-eranet-cofund_en.pdf. 
57 HORIZON 2020 – WORK PROGRAMME 2016-2017 General Annexes, D. Types of action: specific provisions and funding rates: Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) Cofund actions 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-annex-d-cofund-pcp_en.pdf. 
58 Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions (PPI) Cofund actions http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-annex-d-
cofund-ppi_en.pdf. 
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Type of Action Code Number of Applicants Types of Applicants EU Funding 
Rate 
Description 
European Joint 
Programme59 
EJP 
COFUND 
Min 5 from MS/AC Including research 
funders is obligatory 
(ministries/regional 
authorities, research 
councils, funding 
agencies)+others 
70% Joint programming instrument for 
coordinated national research activities 
designed for research funding bodies 
Coordination and 
Support Action60 
CSA 1 legal entity 
 
100% Research and co-ordination support 
services (standardisation, strategic 
planning, awareness-rising, networking, 
policy dialogs, etc. 
ERC Grants ERC 1 legal entity 
 
100% Frontier research of the highest quality 
Research and 
Innovation Action 
RIA Min 3 legal entities from 3 MS/ACs 
 
100% Basic and applied research 
Innovation Action IA Min 3 legal entities from 3 MS/ACs 
 
70% Planning and design of new or improved 
products, processes and services 
MSCA Cofund MSCA 
COFUND 
1 legal entity 
 
50% Co-funding of national and international 
doctoral and fellowship programmes 
Source: Adopted from: http://www.sfi.ie/international/european-research-area-era/h2020/horizon-2020-calls-explained.html.  
 
                                               
59 HORIZON 2020 – WORK PROGRAMME 2016-2017 General Annexes, D. Types of action: specific provisions and funding rates: European Joint Programme (EJP) Cofund actions 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/wp/2016_2017/annexes/h2020-wp1617-annex-d-ejpcofund_en.pdf. 
60 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-annex-d-csa_en.pdf. 
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Figure 18 EC Contribution for PCP Cofund actions 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
 
 
Figure 19 EC Contribution for PCP Cofund actions in BSR 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
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Figure 20 Share of EC Contribution for PCP Cofund actions by Membership Status and Type of 
Organisation 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
 
 
Figure 21 EC Contribution for EJPs in BSR 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
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Figure 22 EC Contribution for EJPs 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
 
 
Figure 23 Distribution of EC Contribution for EJPs 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
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Figure 24 Ratios (Tolerance) of EU13/EU15 Participants in Granted Projects 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. Note: The 0-values are truncated, and the total number 
of projects in FP7 is 25,205 and H2020 is 10,966. 
 
 
Figure 25 Ratios (Tolerance) of EU15/EU13 Participants in Granted Projects 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. Note: The 0-values are truncated, and the total number 
of projects in FP7 is 25,205 and H2020 is 10,966. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 501 1001 1501 2001 2501 3001 3501 4001
H2020: EU13/EU15
FP7: EU13/EU15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 501 1001 1501 2001 2501 3001 3501 4001
H2020: EU15/EU13
FP7: EU15/EU13
91 
 
 
 
Figure 26 Number of Project Applications per year (2007-2013 FP7, 2014 Sum of FP7 and H2020, 2015-2016 H2020) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
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Figure 27 Participations in BONUS 2014-2020 projects by countries 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BONUS projects (https://www.bonusportal.org/projects/). 
 
 
Figure 28 Participations in INTERREG 2016-2017 (as of September) projects by countries 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INTERREG projects database. 
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Figure 29 Funding of INTERREG 2016-2017 (as of September) Projects by Countries (total funding on the left axis and average on the right axis). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INTERREG projects database. 
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Figure 30 EC Contributions by H2020 Thematic Pillars 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
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Figure 31 EC Contributions by H2020 Thematic Pillars, EU13 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
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Figure 32 Numbers of Projects in H2020 Widening Pillars 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
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Figure 33 EC Contributions in Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation Pillar 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCorda. 
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Figure 34 Applications of PRCs per 1000 R&D FTE in Business Enetrprise and Private Non-
Profit Sectors 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on application data from eCORDA and Total R&D 
personnel by sectors of performance, occupation and sex [Table index: rd_p_persocc] from 
OECD. 
 
 
Figure 35 Applications of HES per 1000 R&D FTE in Higher Education Sector 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on application data from eCORDA and Total R&D 
personnel by sectors of performance, occupation and sex [Table index: rd_p_persocc] from 
OECD. 
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Figure 36 Applications of PUB and RECs per 1000 R&D FTE in Government Sector 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on application data from eCORDA and Total R&D 
personnel by sectors of performance, occupation and sex [Table index: rd_p_persocc] from 
OECD. 
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Figure 37 Number of Applicationsby Types of Institutions 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on eCORDA. 
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Appendix 4: List of Interviewed Scientists, Entrepreneurs, 
Government Officials and Policy Makers 
Target Group Date The representative 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
UNIVERSITIES 10 April 
2017 
A focus group with Dr. Malle Krunks (Director and Lead 
Researcher) and Dr. Maarja Grossberg (Senior Researcher), 
School of Engineering, Department of Materials and 
Environmental Technology, TTÜ 
 12 April 
2017 
A focus group with Prof. Jüri Elken and Prof. Urmas Lips, 
School of Science, Department of Marine Systems, TTÜ 
 21 April 
2017 
A focus group with Prof. Gert Jervan, Prof. Jaan Raik and Prof. 
Maarja Kruusmaa, School of Information Technologies, 
Department of Computer Systems / Department of Computer 
Engineering, TTÜ 
 25 April 
2017 
Dr. Kai Pata, Senior Researcher, School of Digital 
Technologies, Centre for Educational Technology, Tallinn 
University 
 25 April 
2017 
Prof. Ellu Saar, School of Governance, Law and 
Society/previously Institute of International and Social 
Studies, Tallinn University 
 17 May 
2017 
Prof. Erkki Truve, School of Science, Department of Chemistry 
and Biotechnology, TTÜ 
 19 May 
2017 
A focus group with Prof. Jarek Kurnitski and Prof. Targo 
Kalamees, School of Engineering, Department of Civil 
Engineering and Architecture, TTÜ 
 2 June 
2017 
A focus group with Prof. Maaja Vadi and Prof. Urmas 
Varblane, School of Economics and Business Administration, 
University of Tartu 
 20 June 
2017 
Dr. Marco Kirm, Vice Rector of Research, University of Tartu 
 22 June 
2017 
Prof. Ülle Jaakma, Vice Rector of Research, Estonian 
University of Life Sciences 
NCPs 30 May 
2017 
A focus group with Ülle Must (Chief Specialist, Joint Research 
Centre, other forms of International collaboration, incl. 
COST), Margit Ilves (Senior Advisor Financial Aspects, SMEs, 
EIT), Ülle Napa (Senior Advisor on Climate Action, 
Environment, Resource Efficiency and Raw Materials) 
ENTERPRISES   
 28 April 
2017 
Rene Jõeleht, CEO, Optofluid Technologies OÜ 
 5 May 2017 Dr. Peeter Laud, Scientific Director, Cybernetica AS 
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Target Group Date The representative 
 23 May 
2017 
Silver Toomla, Managing Partner / Senior Consultant, Invent 
Baltics OÜ 
 13 June 
2017 
Dr. Jako Kilter, Power System Expert, Elering AS / Associate 
Professor, School of Engineering, Department of Electrical 
Power Engineering and Mechatronics, TTÜ 
 29 May 
2017 
Dr. Peep Küngas, CEO of SOA Trader OÜ, Senior Research 
Fellow at University of Tartu, Institute of Computer Science. 
INTERNATIONAL (REGIONAL) LEVEL 
 19 June 
2017 
Skype interview with Mr. Jakob Just Madsen, Head of office, 
DANRO (The Danish EU Research Liaison Office)  
 26 April 
2017 
Interview with Mr. Leif Eriksson, Swedish Research Council 
 26 April 
2017 
Interview with Mr. Andreas Mahlzahn, Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Health, Science and Equality, Schleswig Holstein 
 26 April 
2017 
Interview with Mr. Klaus von Lepel, Ministry of Science, 
Research and Equalities, Hamburg 
 28 March 
2017 
Focus group with Prof. Jarmo Kortelainen and Dr. Petri Kahila, 
University of Eastern Finland 
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Appendix 5: List of Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Description 
Art. 185 Article 185 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
enables the EU to participate in research programmes undertaken jointly 
by several Member States, including participation in the structures 
created for the execution of national programmes. 
BONUS BONUS is a joint Baltic Sea research and development programme 
producing knowledge to support development and implementation of 
regulations, policies and management practices specifically tailored for 
the Baltic Sea region. 
BOVA The Baltic Forestry, Veterinary and Agricultural University Network 
BSN Baltic Science Network 
BSR Baltic Sea Region 
BSRUN Baltic Sea Region University Network 
BUP Baltic University Programme 
CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CEF Connecting Europe Facility 
COFUND-EJP European Joint Programme Cofund 
COSME European Union Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
COST European Cooperation on Science and Technology 
CSA Coordination and Support Action 
EC European Commission 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEIG European Economic Interest Grouping 
EIP European Innovation Partnership 
EIT European Institute for Innovation and Technology 
ERA European Research Area 
ERA-NET European Research Area Net 
ERC European Research Council 
ESIF European Structural Investment Funds 
ETP European Technology Platform 
EU European Union 
EU13 BG – Bulgaria, CZ – Czech Republic, CY – Cyprus, EE – Estonia, HR – 
Croatia, HU – Hungary, LT – Lithuania, LV – Latvia MT – Malta, PL – Poland, 
RO – Romania, SI – Slovenia, and SK – Slovakia 
EU15 AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, DE – Germany, DK – Denmark, EL – Greece, ES 
– Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LU – Luxembourg, 
NL – Netherlands, PT – Portugal, SE – Sweden and UK – United Kingdom 
EUA European University Association 
EUSBSR EU Strategy for Baltic Sea Region 
104 
 
FET Future and Emerging Technologies 
FP Framework Programme 
FP7 7th Framework Program 
FTI Fast Track to Innovation 
GUILD Guild of European Research-Intensive Universities 
GVCs Global Value Chains 
H2020 Horizon 2020 
HEI Higher Education Institution 
HELCOM Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission – Helsinki Commission 
HES Higher or secondary education institution 
IA Innovation Action  
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
INTERREG Community initiative which aims to stimulate interregional cooperation 
JPI Joint Programming Initiative 
JRC Joint Research Centre 
JTI Joint Technology Initiative 
KIC Knowledge and Innovation Community 
LEIT Leadership in Enabling and Industrial Technologies 
LERU League of European Research Universities 
MSCA Marie-Skłodowska-Curie Actions 
NARMA Norwegian Network for Administration and Research Management 
NCM Nordic Council of Ministries 
NCP National Contact Points 
NOVA The Nordic Forestry, Veterinary and Agricultural University Network 
OTH Other institution type 
P2P Public to Public Partnership 
PCP Pre-Commercial Procurement 
PPI Public Procurement of Innovation Solutions 
PPP Public-Private Partnerships 
PRC Private for-profit (excluding education) institution 
PRC Private firms 
PUB Public body (excluding research and education) 
RDI Research, development and innovation 
REC Public-sector research institutes 
RI Research Infrastructures 
RIA Research and Innovation Actions  
S2E Stairway to Excellence 
SC1 Societal Challenge 1: Health, demographic change and wellbeing 
SC2 Societal Challenge 2: Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, 
marine and maritime and inland water research and the bioeconomy 
SC3 Societal Challenge 3: Secure, clean and efficient energy 
SC4 Societal Challenge 4: Smart, green and integrated transport 
SC5 Societal Challenge 5: Climate action, environment, resource efficiency 
and raw materials 
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SC6 Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative 
and reflective societies 
SC7 Societal Challenge 7: Secure societies protecting freedom and security of 
Europe and its citizens 
SEWP Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation 
SME Small or Medium-Sized Enterprise  
STRING STRING as an organisation is a political crossborder partnership between 
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, the Capital Region of 
Denmark, the Region Zealand and the City of Copenhagen in Denmark, 
and the Region Skåne in Sweden. 
SWAFS Science with and for Society 
TRL Technology Readiness Levels are indicators of the maturity level of 
particular technologies. This measurement system provides a common 
understanding of technology status and addresses the entire innovation 
chain: TRL 1 – basic principles observed; TRL 2 – technology concept 
formulate; TRL 3 – experimental proof of concept; TRL 4 – technology 
validated in lab; TRL 5 – technology validated in relevant environment; 
TRL 6 – technology demonstrated in relevant environment; TRL 7 – 
system prototype demonstration in operational environment; TRL 8 – 
system complete and qualified; TRL 9 – actual system proven in 
operational environment 
UNI Universities 
UNIMED Mediterranean Universities Union 
VASAB Vision and Strategies Around Baltic Sea. VASAB is intergovernmental 
multilateral co-operation of 11 countries of the BSR in spatial planning 
and development. 
WP Work Package 
